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Article
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY AND THE EXAGGERATED ROLE OF
RULES: A SURVEY OF INTRA-STATE UNIFORMITY IN THREE
STATES THAT HAVE NOT ADOPTED THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
THOMAS 0. MAIN*
U NIFORMITY is a recurring theme of procedural reform. So
deeply is the idea of uniformity embedded in American legal
thought that many proceduralists find it difficult or unnecessary to ex-
plain why uniformity is thought to be good. Whether because of the
lure of simplicity,1 the appearance of neutrality, 2 the likeness to sci-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law. Thanks to Professors Mark Brodin, John Leubsdorf, Martha Minow, Gregory
Pingree and Stephen Subrin for their comments on drafts.
1. SeeJanice Toran, 'Tis a Gft to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89
MICH. L. REv. 352, 353-54 (1990) (discussing aesthetic appeal of simplicity in soci-
ology, politics and economics). ProfessorJanice Toran has suggested that proce-
dural reformers are drawn to simple, elegant solutions, not only because such
solutions may prove especially workable, but also because they are more aestheti-
cally pleasing than more complicated alternatives. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, AN-
CIENT LAw 13 (1873) (discussing origination of systems of code law); Alexander
Holtzoff, Origins and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1057, 1058 (1955) (stating that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were hailed as
"the simplest ... procedure yet devised in Anglo-American jurisprudence").
2. See Thomas Wall Shelton, An Efficient Judicial System, 22 CASE & COMMENT
227, 230 (1915) ("There is a fixed notion that politics have no respectable place in
the judicial department of government."). The professed ideal is one of procedu-
ral neutrality in which the system of adjective law provides the disputants a level
playing field on which to resolve their disputes. See Paul Carrington, Making Rules
to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-
Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 2067, 2074 (1989) (discussing
"political neutrality" as goal of federal rulemaking). It follows that the legal system
ought to strive for uniform rules that treat similar cases in a similar manner. See
Stephen Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1932 (1989) ("[Uniformity] must be a goal, how-
ever difficult to attain, of a system that aspires to equal justice ...."); see also
George Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conservative Court
Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 667-68 (1993) (describing classical position
regarding forum shopping). Accepting a clear separation of substance and proce-
dure, a uniform procedural rule ensures the essential neutrality of adjective law.
(311)
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ence, 3 the feel of efficiency, 4 the imprimatur of professionalism 5 or some
combination of these, the norm of procedural uniformity enjoys virtually
universal approval. 6 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of
uniformity is both pervasive and predominant in the discourse of procedu-
ral reform.
Uniformity long has been a fundamental theme of procedural re-
form. 7 Indeed, both of the major reform movements in American proce-
dural history were bred primarily of efforts to establish procedural
uniformity. First, in this country, uniformity was introduced as a standard
for procedural reform in the early nineteenth century as a rejection of the
disparity between the procedural systems of law and equity inherited from
See Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common Law-
Codes-Federal Rules, 14 VAND. L. REv. 899, 901 n.12 (1961) ("[Tlhe primary objec-
tive of all procedure should be to secure to parties the full measure of their sub-
stantive rights (or impose upon them their duties under substantive law)."); see also
Robert Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Struc-
ture From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 79 (1989) (discuss-
ing early twentieth-century uniform reform); Eric Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to
the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 344 (1990)
(discussing retooling of procedural rules and resulting efficiency in system).
3. See Kenneth Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 929, 945 (1983) (stating that "lack of uniformity is a threat to the claim that
procedure is a value-free science"). Early in the twentieth century, Shelton wrote
that procedural uniformity was the "key that [would] unlock the door to a new era
of scientific juridical relations." Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Rela-
tions, 23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 392 (1916) (discussing promulgation of rules
under Supreme Court modeled after English procedure).
4. See Robert Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. PIrr. L. REv. 853, 853 (1989) (describing objectives of federal uniform rules
of procedure). Many scholars argue that uniformity promotes efficiency in the
federal courts because surprises are reduced and attorneys and litigants know how
to proceed when they act under a set of rules that are uniform and thus, predict-
able. See Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 41 MICH. L. REv. 205, 224 (1942) (concluding that discovery rules provide
simple and cohesive ways by which to proceed through trial); William Mitchell,
Uniform State and Federal Practice: A New Demand for More Efficient Judicial Procedure,
24 A.B.A.J. 981, 983 (1938) (discussing progress made in reform ofjudicial proce-
dure); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and States Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2002-05 (1989)
[hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules] (analyzing pro-uniformity argument).
5. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2004-05 (discussing rationales for
uniform system of procedural rules). In 1926, Edson Sunderland wrote that the
legal profession is the most highly unified of all professional groups. See Edson
Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L. Rv. 725, 725
(1926) (discussing influence of legal profession and attorneys).
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of the Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REv. 757, 781 (1995) ("[T]oday few question the value of
[procedural] uniformity.").
7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 759 (discussing movement toward local-
ism in procedural rules); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2002 (describing
need for uniformity in federal rules).
[Vol. 46: p. 311
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the English.8 Reformers argued that the separation of law and equity was
inefficient and that a uniform set of procedural rules would establish or-
der and predictability. 9 This movement resulted in New York state's 1848
adoption of the Field Code, the prototype for the practice codes in all the
states that would adopt code pleading.10
Procedural uniformity also was a central theme of the early twentieth-
century movement to reform federal procedure.11 Beginning in 1911, the
American Bar Association (ABA), following the urging of Virginia lawyer
Thomas Wall Shelton, lobbied Congress for a bill that would enable the
Supreme Court to promulgate uniform procedural rules for all federal
district courts. 12 What Shelton's call for procedural uniformity lacked in
modesty and nuance, it supplied in passion:
[Uniformity is] so splendid, so beautiful and so beneficial in
every respect, as to command unstintedly the loving labor, time
and treasure of the best men of this marvelous age in which we
live. There must be . . . uniformity of judicial procedure ....
There are agencies at work too earnest and powerful to be
thwarted by ignorance, pessimism or evil .... I have the most
implicit faith in the Divine origin of the great basic principles,
8. See Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An Historical
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAw & HIST. REv. 311, 316 (1988) [herein-
after Subrin, Field Code] (describing work done by Field in codification and reform
of rules of procedure); see also Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Develop-
ment of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 238 (1942) (discussing
generally evolution of New York Code of Procedure); Stephen N. Subrin, How Eq-
uity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspec-
tive, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 928 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity] (reviewing
history of English and American legal civil procedure).
9. See David Dudley Field, What Shall Be Done with the Practice of Lawyers? Ques-
tions Addressed to Lawyers, reprinted in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PA-
PERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226 (A. Sprague ed., 1884) (discussing impact of New
York state constitution on legal procedures in court system); see also id. at 363 (dis-
cussing reforms in first report of New York Practice Commission).
10. See generally N.Y. Laws 1848 ch. 379. In code pleading reform, a uniform
system of law and equity administered through the form of one civil action was
substituted for what had been two separate law and equity systems, and the forms
of actions at law and the separate suit in equity were abolished. Professor Pomeroy
considered this the most fundamental part of code pleading. SeeJOHN POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES §§ 5-6 (5th ed. 1929) (discussing general principles of joining of
legal and equitable actions); see also CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND'ENGLAND 8 (1897) (stating that uniform-
ity that code pleading offered, and which many reformers embraced, was apparent
simplicity and certainty in its application).
11. See Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, at 992-95 (discussing early twentieth cen-
tury approaches to civil procedure reform).
12. See id. at 949 (discussing Shelton and ABA Enabling Act movement in
nineteenth century); see also Edson Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA.
L.Q. 5, 5 (1938) (noting impact of promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure on Virginia). See generally Thomas Wall Shelton, An American Common Law in
the Making-The Habit of Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAw NOTES 50 (1926).
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and fundamentals of the law that governed the Hebrews, were
used by the Athenians, borrowed by the Romans, reluctantly ab-
sorbed by the English and are being adopted in America. And I
believe they have existed since God said "Let there be light," co-
incident with the laws of nature and of the universe .... [Uni-
formity] symbolize[s] an unselfish love of country and a
surrender of personal inclinations that will ... solidify sentiment
and reincarnate the old time respect and veneration for the
courts. 13
This second American reform movement culminated in the 1938 adoption
of uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rhetoric of procedural uniformity also has informed more mod-
est reform movements. Contemporary examples include, among many
others, the effort to remove the "opt-out" provision from the mandatory
discovery disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a) (1),14 the drafting of legislation authorizing the aggregation of mass
tort claims, 15 efforts to normalize the imposition of sanctions by judges, 16
13. Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniformity of Judicial Procedure and Decision, 22 LAw
STUDENT'S HELPER 5, 9 (1914) [hereinafter Shelton, Uniformity]; see also B.H. Carey,
In Favor of Uniformity, 3 F.R.D. 507, 507 (1943) (stating that Federal Rules are "one
of the greatest contributions to the free and unhampered administration of law
and justice ever struck off by any group of men since the dawn of civilized law");
Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure-Let Congress Set the Supreme Court
Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 321-22 (1911) (broadly discussing history of system and its
problems).
14. The initial disclosure requirements added by the 1993 amendments per-
mitted districts to "opt out" of the rule. The amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 establishing uniformity was effective December 1, 2000. See FED. R.
Crv. P. 26 advisory comm. note (noting that changes in rule were based upon past
experience of district courts); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d) amends. (removing
"opt-out" provisions for mandated timing and sequence of discovery); FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(f) amends. (removing "opt-out" provision for discovery conference); Eliza-
beth Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Pro-
posals, 52 SMU L. REv. 229, 262-63 (1999) (describing proposed amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
15. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148
U. PA. L. Riv. 1943 (2000) (discussing legislative and other proposals for uniform
adjudication of mass tort claims); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80
B.U. L. REv. 461 (2000) (noting need for Uniform Complex Litigation Act);
Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems and Proposals: A Report to the Mass Torts
Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328 (1999) (discussing legislative and other proposals
for uniform adjudication of mass tort claims).
16. See, e.g., Maureen Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the
1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 677, 689 (1996) (discussing need
to limit judicial discretion in federal courts' sanctions); Joel Slawotsky, Rule 37Dis-
covery Sanctions-The Need for Supreme Court Ordered National Uniformity, 104 DICK. L.
Riv. 471, 474 (2000) (reviewing American Law Institute's statutory recommenda-
tions to encourage consolidation of actions in federal and state courts).
[Vol. 46: p. 311
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and proposals to systematically integrate alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms into federal courts. 17
The tenor of the rhetoric of uniformity is often resonant of Shelton's
tenor at the turn of the twentieth century.' 8 For example, several contem-
porary reforms reflect a trend toward localism in procedural rulemaking.
The proliferation of local rules of procedure in the late 1980s and early
17. See, e.g., John Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity Be Better?,
34 DuQ. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1996) (reviewing passage of Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARiz. L. REv.
781, 827 (1998) (discussing agency dispute resolution and nonjudicial alternatives
for disputing parties).
For examples of other procedural reform discourse implicating the rhetoric
of uniformity, see Tara L. Haluch, Treatment of Americans with Disabilities Act Claims
When the Plaintiff Is Deceased: A Call for Uniformity, 48 EMORY L.J. 733, 735 (1999)
(noting need for uniform survivorship rule for plaintiffs under Americans with
Disabilities Act); Ted Janger, The Public Choice of Choice of Law in Software Transac-
tions: Jurisdictional Competition and the Dim Prospects for Uniformity, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 187, 188-89 (2000) (discussing choice-of-law in multijurisdictional transactions);
Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases, 33 U. RIcH. L. Rv. 41, 41 (1999) (analyzing need for uniformity in
standard for exemplary damages). See generally Bridget Genteman Hoy, Comment,
The Draft Uniform Mediation Act in Context: Can It Clear Up the Clutter?, 44 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1121 (2000) (discussing draft of National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws).
And, of course, the rhetoric of uniformity is deployed far outside the parame-
ters of civil procedure. A quick review of recent legal scholarship provides a range
of examples from many disciplines including: bankruptcy; evidence; tort; environ-
mental; cyberspace; trusts; maritime and criminal law. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 4, 66-67 (1998) (dis-
cussing uniform definitions of criminal offenses); James Joseph Duane, Appellate
Review of In Limine Rulings, 182 F.R.D. 666, 666 (1999) (discussing proposed new
rules for Federal Rules of Evidence); Avishai Glikman, The New Unform Principal
and Income Act: Friend or Foe?, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 463, 468 (2000) (describing
chapter 145 of Uniform Principal and Income Act); Edward J. Janger, The Locus of
Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Federal Law, and Bankruptcy Reform, 74 AM. BANuKR.
L.J. 97, 101 (2000) (discussing uniformity in bankruptcy law); A. Brooke Overby,
Will Cyberlaw Be Uniform? An Introduction to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, 7 TUL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 219, 220 (1999) (discussing need for uniform-
ity of laws for electronic commerce); Pratik A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 104 (2000) (discussing UCITA's
effect on uniformity of law regarding computer information transactions); William
Tetley, Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons, and Alterna-
tives to International Conventions-How to Adopt an International Convention, 24 TUL.
MAR. LJ. 775, 778 (2000) (noting existence of advantages and disadvantages of
uniformity in international private maritime law); Note, A Comparative Analysis of
Dramshop Liability and a Praposal for Unform Legislation, 25 IowAJ. CoRP. L. 553, 574
(2000) (proposing uniformity in legislation for dramshop acts); Comment, Confu-
sion and Deterrence: The Problems That Arise from a Deficiency in Uniform Laws and
Procedures for Environmental "Whistleblowers," 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 325, 339
(1999) (proposing uniform model whistleblower statute).
18. For a discussion of intra-district uniformity, see infra notes 37-60 and ac-
companying test.
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1990s, 19 the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,20 and the 1993 amendments
to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 1 all
have contributed to an increasing diversity of procedures in federal courts
across the country. 22 Critics have warned that such inter-district dis-
uniformity would "turn federal practice into a veritable Tower of Babel," 23
would lead to a "balkanization" of procedure, 24 would constitute part of a
"counter-reformation in procedural justice ... [that was] at war" with pro-
19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 authorizes each of the United States
district and circuit courts to promulgate local rules. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6,
at 757 ("The federal rules themselves permit individual district courts to enact
their own local rules."). Traditionally, these local rules dealt with relatively minor
matters, such as the size and type of paper to be used. But, beginning in the 1980s,
local rules began to address more important aspects of court procedure and there
was significant variance among the districts. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4,
at 2020-21 (discussing Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project's 1988 Report); see
also Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the District Courts-A Survey, 1966
DuKE LJ. 1011, 1013 (discussing variations in procedural rules among district
courts).
20. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-65 §§ 101-105, 104 Stat.
5089-98 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482). The Civil Justice Reform Act
sought "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor
discovery, improve litigation management and ensure just, speedy and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes." 28 U.S.C. § 471. The primary mechanism of the Civil
Justice Reform Act was to require each of the ninety-four United States district
courts (and their adjunct advisory committees established under the Act) to imple-
ment a "civil justice delay and expense reduction plan." Id. § 472. See generally
Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 757 (noting history surrounding adoption of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The
Challenge of the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 877, 878 (1993)
(discussing generally Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
21. In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in significant
ways, particularly with regard to discovery procedure. The discovery amendments
impose new mandatory initial disclosure obligations, but allowed districts to opt-
out by local rule and allowed parties to opt-out by stipulation. See generally Richard
L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747 (1998) (discussing dis-
covery amendments). The provision allowing local districts to opt-out by local rule
was removed by the 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For further discussion, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
22. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 757 (discussing adoption of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 374 (1982) (discussing shift in role and power of district judges).
23. See Linda Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN.
L. REv. 375, 381 n.22 (1992) (crediting Professor Rosenberg as first to use Tower
of Babel metaphor for local rules).
24. See Carl Tobias, CivilJustice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1427 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Justice Reform]
(noting balkanization of federal civil procedure resulting from rules). But see Carl
Tobias, Fin-De-Siecle Federal Civil Procedure, 51 FLA. L. REv. 641, 659 (1995) [herein-
after Tobias, Fin-De-Siecle] (cautioning against exaggeration of empirical data of
balkanization).
316
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cedural uniformity,2 5 and would pose a serious threat to the "integrity of
[uniform] federal civil procedure. '26
Why the popularity of uniformity rhetoric? In large part because of
the universality of uniformity. First, reformers are inclined to "speak of
uniformity as if it were some excellence in itself, something transcendental
and absolute; or at least as an undoubted blessing, as health, happiness or
virtue."2 7 To be sure, there are critics of uniformity, but these commenta-
tors very seldom take issue with the normative value of procedural uni-
formity. Rather, they dispute the notion that a proposed reform is
necessarily just, fair or efficient simply because it promotes uniformity.2 8
Second, the concept of uniformity seems universal because it is pro-
tean and multi-dimensional so that procedural uniformity has evolved in
many forms. Thus, uniformity is universal in that it can mean all things to
all people. For example, in the ongoing discourse of reform concerning
substance-specific (or non-trans-substantive) procedures for the federal
courts, the rhetoric of uniformity is deployed by both "sides" of the de-
bate. Some scholars have defended the status quo and the drafters' vision
of a set of uniform rules of procedures for all types of cases. 29 In contrast,
other reformers have argued that the drafters' true vision of procedural
uniformity-equal treatment for equal cases-demands substance-specific
25. See Mullenix, supra note 23, at 382 (noting damage done by CJRA).
26. Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 24, at 1427; see also Paul D. Car-
rington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DuKE L.J. 929, 929-
30 (1996) [hereinafter Carrington, A New Confederacy?] (noting problems which
occur when local rules and national rules of procedure conflict); Edward D.
Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Affecting the Federal Courts Be Remedied by
Local Rules ?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 728 (1993) (discussing how federal rules of
civil procedure have been undermined by different courts adopting different pro-
cedural rules); Keeton, supra note 4, at 857 (noting that local procedural rules can
interfere with uniform judicial decision-making); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note
4, at 2001 ("The local rule and state divergence from procedural uniformity sug-
gests that, without fanfare, we have already taken our first tentative steps into a new
era in American civil procedure.").
27. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2000 n.5 (quoting Connor Hall, Uni-
form Law Procedure in Federal Courts, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 131, 132 (1927)).
28. See, e.g., Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2000 n.5 (noting Hall's anal-
ysis of whether procedural uniformity is necessary).
Uniformity is not one of those norms that defines an individual's jurispruden-
tial philosophy of procedure. Indeed, there is no cadre of reformers for whom
uniformity (or disuniformity) is, in and of itself, the organizing principle. Instead,
.uniformity" is simply effective rhetoric that is used in the discourse of reform.
29. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 781 (discussing benefits of uniform sys-
tem of procedural rules).
2001]
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procedures in certain instances.3 0 Such is the universal fluidity of the
rhetoric of uniformity.
3
'
30. Robert Cover highlights this debate in his classic essay that exposed the
limitations of trans-substantive rules. See Robert Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 721 (1975) (examining influ-
ence of procedure on substance). Much has been written to shed light on the
issue of whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can or should be trans-sub-
stantive, as this is an issue that arises in many different "contexts." See Phyllis Bau-
mann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and
Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 218, 299-303 (1992) (noting
practical implications for attorneys trying to integrate substance and procedure);
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legiti-
macy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEo. L.J. 887, 890 (1999) (discussing issue of proce-
dural reform in federal area); Stephen Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MIcH. L.
REv. 1463, 1471 (1987) (noting influence of procedural rules on substantive laws);
Stephen Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Com-
mon Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 831 (1986) (discussing pre-
clusion of state law and full faith and credit); Stephen Burbank, Of Rules and
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693, 695 (1988) (discussing implications of federal courts borrowing state limita-
tion laws); Stephen Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1964-67 (1989) (suggesting ways in
which to study procedural issues in court system); John Burritt McArthur, Inter-
Branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L.
REv. 551, 555 (1999) (discussing Civil Justice Reform Act); Carrington, supra note
2, at 2068 (stating that "judicially-made rules directing courts to proceed differ-
ently according to the substantive nature of the rights enforced" should be re-
jected); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. Rv. 1, 24 (1995) (discussing whether Del-
aware system of law can be uniformly used across other states); Geoffrey Hazard,
Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2244-47 (1989) (describing the trans-substantive scope of
federal rules of civil procedure); Richard Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Pros-
pects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 776-79 (1993) (noting problems
of trans-substantivity related to federal rules); Linda Mullenix, Hope Over Experience:
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 798
(1991) (discussing rules of civil procedure that impact informal discovery); Judith
Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 547
(1986) (arguing that procedural rules need to be reworked); Maurice Rosenberg,
The Federal Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243, 248-50 (1984) (noting
difficulties of enforcing rules); Gene Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phan-
tom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 86 (1991) (analyzing impact of Rule 15 on litigation);
Jeffrey Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future, 46 FLA. L. REv. 57, 78
(1994) (stating that use of selective substance-specific procedure is necessary);
Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2000 (discussing need for uniformity in dis-
trict courts); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Back-
ground of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 693 (1998) (noting
history of promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Stephen N. Subrin,
Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific
Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REv. 28, 55 (1994) (suggesting that different procedural rules
should apply to different factual cases); Carl Tobias, More Modern Civil Process, 56
U. Prr. L. REv. 801, 804 (1995) (discussing modern civil procedural rules); Carl
Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1505
(1992) (discussing judicial interpretation of federal rules).
31. Such universality is not always without cost. Jack Pole's analysis of "equal-
ity" may prove insightful. Upon finding that many pursuits of equality were oppo-
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To better understand the role of uniformity rhetoric in the discourse
of procedural reform, this Article examines one type of procedural uni-
formity and uses those findings to consider broader implications for pro-
cedural uniformity generally. The survey presented in this Article
examines procedural uniformity and disuniformity in the federal and state
courts of three states that have not formally adopted all of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This type of uniformity is usually referred to as
"intra-state uniformity,"3 2 and the history of this norm is set forth in Part
1.
3 3 Generally speaking, the goal of intra-state textual uniformity has not
been met. Only half of the states have formally adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and even among these, most states have not attempted
to conform to changes in the federal model.
Part II presents the results of a survey of intra-state uniformity in prac-
tice in the federal and state courts of three states that have not formally
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 34 Based upon a review of
hundreds of judicial opinions, the survey presents evidence of uniform
procedural standards within the federal and state courts of each state in
practice, notwithstanding fundamental differences in the texts of those fed-
eral and state procedural rules.
Part III explores the cause of the dissonance between form and prac-
tice.35 The cause of the dissonance appears to be the convergence of two
factors: indeterminate pleading rules and the unifying influence of a local
legal culture. Neither the standard of "notice pleading" under the Federal
Rules nor the requirement of "fact pleading" under the state procedural
codes establishes a clear and decisive mandate for the quantum of specific-
ity required in a civil complaint. In addition, although the regimes of no-
tice and code pleading are fundamentally antithetical, the legal
community within the federal and state courts of each of the states appears
to assimilate those pleading standards in practice.
Part IV considers the broader implications of the survey.3 6 The survey
demonstrates that the familiar rhetoric of uniformity can be misplaced or
even misleading absent empirical review of one fundamental assumption:
that any existing formal (or textual) disuniformity necessarily means that
there is disuniformity in practice. Indeed, the rhetoric of uniformity may
be deployed to advance a particular reform when, in practice-even if not
in form-uniformity already exists. Of course, even when uniformity does
sitional, he suggested that "the pursuit of equality was the pursuit of an illusion."
JACK R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALrr' IN AMERICAN HISTORY 292 (1978) (analyz-
ing reasoning of court in Japanese-American cases during World War II and other
similar cases).
32. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2027 (discussing state uniformity
and divergence regarding procedural rules).
33. See infra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 61-269 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 270-303 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 304-22 and accompanying text.
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exist in practice, the reform still may be worthwhile, but the rhetoric of
uniformity presumably would be far less compelling. Moreover, the evi-
dence that a local legal culture can trump, or at least significantly influ-
ence the interpretation of, pleading rules suggests, more generally, that
there may be limitations upon the ability of formal rules to effectuate legal
reform.
I. THE NORM OF INTRA-STATE UNIFORMITY
One dimension of procedural uniformity is the quest for identical for-
mal (or textual) rules for federal and state courts, or intra-state uniformity.
Intra-state uniformity was realized, to some extent, under the nineteenth-
century Conformity Acts,3 7 but the resulting mandate for federal courts to
follow state procedure "as near as may be" was unpopular and largely un-
obtainable.3 8 Moreover, the Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was, of course, without authority to enact proce-
dural rules for the state courts.3 9 Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee
anticipated, indeed promised, that the Federal Rules would be so enlight-
ened and simple that intra-state uniformity would follow naturally as states
voluntarily adopted the federal model:
[T] he conceded failure of state conformity called for a substitute.
The Federal government could not follow the states, so it was
reasonable to give the states an opportunity to follow the Federal
government. That state which tries to live unto itself will suffer, if
it does not perish. In spite of ourselves, we are all for one and
one for all .... Secondly, a simple, scientific, correlated system
of rules, such as would be prepared and promulgated by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, would prove a model that
would, for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be
adopted by the states. 40
37. See, e.g., Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
38. See id. Shelton and other ABA proponents of the Rules Enabling Act in-
sisted that the Conformity Act was a failure and that most knowledgeable people
agreed. See Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. Ruv.
1015, 1040-42 (1982) (discussing problems of federal practice under Conformity
Act); Shelton, Uniformity, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing failure of legislature to
provide leadership in procedure law). See generally Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, at
957-58 n.284 (noting critics' comments regarding Conformity Act); Subrin, Federal
Rules, supra note 4, at 2002-11 (describing "the many faces of uniformity" in federal
system).
39. See Rules Enabling Act, Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1 & 2, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072) ("To give the Supreme Court of
the United States authority to make and publish rules in actions at law."). Seegener-
ally Burbank, supra note 38, at 1035-36 (reviewing enactment of Conformity Act of
1872).
40. Shelton, supra note 3, at 393; see also Charles Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice,
23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 307 (1938) [hereinafter Clark, Handmaid] ("The new fed-
eral reform is likely... to have an important effect, beyond the direct and immedi-
ate changes it makes in federal practice, in setting the standard and tone of
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In arguing for vigorous implementation of the 1934 Rules Enabling
Act, Charles Clark and James William Moore expressed the cognate hope
that federal rules might "properly be a model to all the states."4 1 As the
principal drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Clark thereafter
tracked the progress of state adoption with paternal pride. For example,
in 1947, he published a state-by-state survey in the second edition of his
treatise on code pleading.4 2 A flurry of state reforms immediately follow-
ing enactment of the Federal Rules prompted Clark to conclude that na-
tional uniformity in systems of civil procedure was becoming a reality.
Clark wrote in 1958 that "the trend of state adoption [was] proceeding
apace."4 3 In 1960, in the first comprehensive survey of state adoption of
the Federal Rules, Professor Charles Alan Wright concluded that, after
twenty years of operating under the Federal Rules, state procedural sys-
tems were approximately evenly divided among procedural systems
modeled on the Federal Rules, the common law and the Field Code.
4 4
Naturally, the rhetoric of uniformity played a substantial role in the debate
over these state reforms.
45
procedural reform throughout the country generally."). See generally CHARLES
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CODE PLEADING 31 (1928) [hereinafter CLARK,
HANDBOOK 1] (describing procedural reform in systems of pleading); Clark, Hand-
maid, supra, at 319-20 (discussing "general philosophy of modern pleading"); Re-
port of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509, 516 (1920)
(recommending adoption of S.1214).
41. See Charles Clark &James William Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44
YALE L.J. 387, 387-90 (1935) (discussing incorporation of uniform rules by differ-
ent courts).
42. See CHARLES CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 31 (2d ed.
1947) [hereinafter CLARK, HANDBOOK 2] (discussing procedural reform in systems
of pleading); see also Charles Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUD-
LEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 67-70 (1949) (discussing federal rules in states and
influence of federal rules of civil procedure).
43. Charles Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1958: Two Decades of
the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 435 (1958).
44. See WILLIAM M. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 9.1-9.53 (Wright ed., 1960) (describing civil procedure reform in
variety of states).
45. See Guthrie Abbott, The Proposed Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure-An Ar-
gumentfor Adoption, 49 Miss. L.J. 285, 291 (1978) (examining benefits arising from
adoption of proposed rules of civil procedure); Charles F. Bongardt, The Final
Draft Report, Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, "Pro," 21 NEB. L. REv. 76, 77 (1942)
(discussing need for new rules of civil procedure in Nebraska); Ira Flory & Henry
McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice, I LA. L. REV. 45, 45 (1938)
(surmising that Louisiana lawyers will easily adjust to new federal rules of civil pro-
cedure); Ben Fowler & George Catlett, Report of the Civil Code Committee, 16 KY. ST.
B.J. 23, 25 (1951) (reviewing major features of proposed new rules of civil proce-
dure); Spencer Gard, Highlights of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, 2 WASHBURN
L.J. 199, 201 (1963) (reviewing highlights of new civil procedure law for Kansas);
Jimmie Hamilton, Pleading: Fact Pleading in Oklahoma-Time for a Change?, 30
OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700 (1977) (arguing for change in Oklahoma provisions of
pleading); Henry McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LA. L.
REv. 369, 373 (1953) (discussing defects of fact pleading generally); Hudson
Moore, Shall Colorado Procedure Conform with the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
2001]
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The momentum behind the Federal Rules as a model for state court
reform began to subside at least twenty years ago-well before universal
textual adoption. In 1986, Professor John Oakley and a former student,
Arthur Coon, were interested in the "prospects for uniformity in American
civil procedure" and undertook a nationwide survey "to assess the degree
to which state court civil procedure is ...wrought in the image of the
Federal Rules."46 As a preliminary observation, Oakley and Coon acknowl-
edged "the pervasive influence of the Federal Rules on at least some part
of every state's civil procedure." 47 In the same article, however, the au-
thors effectively eulogized the goal of intra-state uniformity.48 Based upon
a comprehensive, nine-variable examination of all fifty states, they "were
surprised to find that only a minority of states [had] embraced the system
and philosophy of the Federal Rules wholeheartedly enough to permit
classification as true federal replicas." 49 Moreover, the authors found that
lesser-populated states represented a disproportionately large share of
states that had adopted the rules: of the ten most populous states, only
dure, 15 DICTA 5, 7 (1938) (discussing how procedural rules change under uniform
practice); Harry W. Shackelford, Why Adopt New Rules of Pleading and Practice?, 21
NEB. L. REv. 94, 101-11 (1942) (stating objections to proposed new rules of civil
procedure in Nebraska); Robert Simmons, Why New Rules of Procedure Now?, 26J.
AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v 170, 175 (1943) (discussing differences in rules among
states); see also The Bar Favors Uniform State and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18
TEMPLE L.Q. 145, 145-46 (1943) (reviewing national opinion survey).
46. John Oakley & Arthur Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1368 (1986).
47. Id. at 1369; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 430
(5th ed. 1994) ("The excellence of the rules is such that in more than half the
states the rules have been adapted for state use virtually unchanged, and there is
not a jurisdiction that has not revised its procedure in some way that reflects the
influence of the federal rules.").
48. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 46, at 1369 (noting that there is little state
court adoption of uniform federal model of civil procedure rules).
49. Id. The nine criteria for "replica" status include:
(1) state civil procedure is specified in judicially promulgated rules rather
than a statutory code; (2) these rules are organized and enumerated in
general conformity with the scheme of the [Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure]; (3) there has been a merger of law and equity into one form of
civil action; (4) the substance of the state rules of civil procedure con-
form generally to the federal joinder rules as amended in 1966; (5) the
substance of the state rules of civil procedure conform generally to the
federal discovery rules as amended in 1970; (6) the state rules provide for
summary judgment according to the model of the Federal Rules; (7) the
rules as written and interpreted provide without qualification for the lib-
eral conception of "notice pleading" practiced in federal courts under
the aegis of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); (8) to the extent the
terms of the state rules or their interpretations are otherwise idiosyncratic
or unconventional by federal standards, such variation in practice is not
at bottom inconsistent with the Federal Rules' philosophy of "procedure
as the handmaiden ofjustice"; and (9) the state courts regard precedent
and commentary construing counterpart provisions of the Federal Rules
as persuasive authority in the construction of the state rules.
Id. at 1374-75.
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Ohio had modeled the Federal Rules, but eleven of the fifteen least popu-
lous states were replicas. 50 Even when a "looser test than replication was
applied to classify states as generally following the model of the Federal
Rules, the resulting tally embraced a majority of states but a minority of
our national population." 5 I Finally, Oakley and Coon noted that the pace
of state court conversions to replicas, or to close analogues of the federal
model, had stalled more than a decade earlier in 1975.52
At least one commentator has suggested that the Oakley and Coon
survey actually underestimates the extent of intra-state procedural dis-
uniformity because, not only has state "replication" of the Federal Rules
long since ceased, but even the "replica" states have failed to keep pace
with the flurry of amendments to the Federal Rules that followed Oakley
and Coon's survey:
Since 1980, Federal Rule 26 has been amended in three major
ways .... Only eight of the twenty-two states in the United States
that were considered replica states by the Oakley and Coon sur-
vey have adopted all three Rule 26 amendments. Eleven have
adopted none of them. Fourteen out of twenty-two have adopted
the new Rule 11. At this point, there may be only eight or so
current replica states: Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia. Ohio,
the most populous replica state, has adopted none of the new
rules. 53
Since Professor Subrin made this argument more than ten years ago, the
trend has become even more evident: not only did many of the laggard
"replica" states never adopt these subsequent amendments, 54 but Rule 11
and many of the discovery rules (including Rule 26) were amended yet
again in 1993. 5 5 Remarkably, of the eight replica states identified by Sub-
rin in 1989, only two have adopted the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules
11 and 26.56
50. See id. at 1413 (describing Ohio's status as "replica").
51. Id. at 1369.
52. See id. at 1427 (concluding that trend of state court procedural reform has
ended); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Dis-
integrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155, 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Subrin, Teaching]
(describing "recent blow[s] to uniformity" in procedural requirements among
states).
53. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2037.
54. See generally MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. chs. 43a & 43b (West 1992); S.D. RULES
CODIFIED LAws 15 (Michie 1984).
55. See FED. R. Crv. P., 1993 amends. (referring to Rule 11 and other discovery
rules, including Rule 26).
56. Only Utah and Vermont (the 36th and 48th most populous states, respec-
tively) have replicated the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
11 and 26 in their state court rules. Of the other six states with replica status in
1989, half (North Dakota, Tennessee and West Virginia) adopted only the 1993
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; the other half (Minnesota,
2001]
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Given the pervasiveness of the rhetoric of uniformity in the broader
discourse of procedural reform, this intra-state disuniformity has received
very little attention in the past decade.5 7 This lack of attention is a curious
phenomenon because much of the uniformity rhetoric devoted to the is-
sue of inter-district disuniformity is similarly applicable to intra-state dis-
uniformity. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from Tobias'
seminal indictment of inter-district disuniformity:
Greater ... disuniformity is seen in increasingly disparate local
rules governing the pretrial process and in growing inconsisten-
cies between many local rules that encompass numerous proce-
dural matters and the Federal Rules. This ... disuniformity...
complicates the efforts of lawyers with national practices ... to
participate in lawsuits in districts that follow procedures with
which they are not completely familiar. These problems will af-
flict everyone who litigates in multiple districts, but will be acute
for public interest litigants .... [R]esource deficiencies make it
difficult for the public interest groups and attorneys to learn
about, command, and conform to the procedures .... Increas-
ingly balkanized procedure is not neutral. Procedural choices
that enhance complexity and disuniformity can foster particular
values and serve specific interests. Accumulating evidence sug-
gests that many practitioners and their clients, especially those
with significant resources and information, have increasingly cap-
italized on numerous tactical advantages that growing balkaniza-
tion affords. 58
Montana and Washington) adopted neither. Whether states will replicate the dis-
covery (and other) amendments that became effective December 1, 2000 remains
to be seen.
57. Professors Tobias and Subrin have flagged the issue on occasion. See, e.g.,
Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedu-
ral System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REv. 79, 82-83 (1997) (noting
that intra-state uniformity, anticipated by federal rules, has not developed to ex-
tent believed); Carl Tobias, Opt-Outs at the Outlaw Inn: A Report from Montana, 14
REv. LIG. 207, 214 & n.28 (1994) (discussing intra-state uniformity based on need
to simplify law practice). But Subrin's 1989 piece was the last serious assessment of
this issue. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2037 (discussing different pro-
cedural rules in federal and state systems).
Even the term "intra-state (dis)uniformity" may be disappearing in this con-
text. In one of Professor Tobias' recent articles, he uses the term "intra-state uni-
formity" to refer not to uniformity between the federal and state courts within a
jurisdiction, but rather to uniformity between federal district courts within a partic-
ular state. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 591
(1998) (discussing intra-state uniformity, referring to civil litigants in federal
lawsuits).
58. Tobias, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 24, at 1423-24. Paul Carrington
agrees:
Localism creates legal clutter .... Such legal clutter gives undue advan-
tage to cognoscenti. Normally, these will be local lawyers who are given
an advantage over counsel from other districts. But clutter also favors the
expert litigator over the lawyer making episodic appearances in court
[Vol. 46: p. 311
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Presumably, many of these same problems, deficiencies and tactical disad-
vantages would result from disparate federal and state rules, as from dispa-
rate federal rules. Indeed, it seems likely that there would be at least as
many attorneys-public interest or otherwise-that would practice in fed-
eral and in state courts (e.g., within the same city) than those that would
have "national practices" in federal courts in different districts. Yet the
contemporary literature virtually ignores this apparent intra-state
disuniformity. 5
9
Intra-state uniformity is a dimension of procedural uniformity that is
especially ripe for examination. Its relative obscurity in the discourse of
reform permits the findings of this study to transcend any perceived parti-
ality or bias concerning any pending reform; this survey is not the product
of a hidden agenda (nor, to my knowledge, is there any reform move-
ment) to amend (or not to amend) either the federal or state rules of
procedure to achieve (or to forestall) intra-state uniformity. More impor-
tantly, this obscurity itself lends credibility to the findings of the survey;
indeed, one possible explanation for the silence could be tacit, or perhaps
even unknowing acceptance of the proposition that there already is sub-
stantial procedural uniformity in practice, notwithstanding fundamental
differences between the regimes of notice and code pleading.60
.... As clutter increases, the cost of legal services is also increased by a
diminution of competition and retention of redundant counsel.
Carrington, A New Confederacy ?, supra note 26, at 947-48.
Further, numerous scholars have used the "Tower of Babel" metaphor to de-
pict the dangers of inter-district uniformity. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at
759 ("[T]he proliferation of local rules and the trend to local models of adjudica-
tion threaten to turn federal practice into a veritable Tower of Babel in which no
court follows the process of any sister court."); Sherman L. Cohn, Federal Discovery:
A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63
MINN. L. REv. 253, 265-66 (1979) (discussing lack of uniformity in discovery proce-
dures in individual courts); Mullenix, supra note 23, at 381 (citing Professor Mau-
rice Rosenberg).
Again, these dangers of (inter-district) disuniformity are thought to be signifi-
cant: "Different procedural rules will have an impact upon substantive justice. Va-
rying procedures will lead to forum shopping, unnecessary cost, and widespread
confusion." Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 759.
59. For further discussion on how contemporary literature ignores intra-state
disuniformity, with few exceptions noted see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. There are a couple of other possible explanations for the silence, but the
explanations are not compelling. One might argue that there is no intra-state dis-
uniformity problem because, notwithstanding textual differences between federal
and state rules, the procedural schemata of the two are fundamentally similar.
This argument rings hollow, however, in light of the considerable attention given
inter-district uniformity. Even with the proliferation of local rules, the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, and the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, one could not seriously suggest that the procedures between two federal
district courts are less similar than are the procedures between the federal and
state courts in states where common law or code traditions persist. Even in states
that have abandoned those traditions, true replication of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (much less the Civil Justice Reform Act and local rules) is virtually non-
existent.
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II. THE EVIDENCE OF INTRA-STATE UNIFORMITY IN FACT
Presented here are the findings of a survey that examined intra-state
procedural uniformity in practice in three states that have not replicated
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for their state court procedures-
Illinois, Pennsylvania and Nebraska. These particular states were selected
because they are recognized as being among the states with procedural
systems that are least influenced by the federal model. 61 Indeed, unlike
One might instead argue that there is no intra-state disuniformity problem
because, although there is intra-state disuniformity, it is not a serious problem. It
is unnecessary to tackle the normative component of this statement in this Article.
It should suffice to argue only that however problematic this disuniformity might
be in the abstract, it must be more problematic than inter-district disuniformity for
the reason set forth in the previous paragraph.
There is an additional argument that intra-state disuniformity is not a prob-
lem because state courts are insignificant. This argument is unpersuasive. The
increasing significance of states (and state courts) within the constitutional system
has been dramatically underscored by a series of recent Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress does not
have power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state
courts); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (stating "[t]he
dignity and status of its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts. .. ");
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding that Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 exceeds Congress' power); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to enact or enforce
federal programs and thus, Congress is prohibited from compelling state officers
directly); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress
lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prose-
cuted in federal courts); Baumann et al., supra note 30, at 243 (discussing impact
of cases mandating greater specificity in Title VII complaints); Susan Elizabeth
Powley, Special Project, Exploring a Second Level of Parity: Suggestions for Developing
an Analytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 44
VAND. L. REV. 641, 671-72, 683-86 (1991) (noting potential disadvantages and ad-
vantages in pleading employment discrimination cases in both federal and state
courts).
61. Pennsylvania has been classified as a "Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-
Based Procedural System," and both Illinois and Nebraska have been classified as
"Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural Systems." See Oakley & Coon, supra note
46, at 1407, 1415 & 1428 (classifying civil procedures of states). These classifica-
tions were categories 7 and 8, respectively, on a scale from 1 to 8, with I being the
most strict replication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. The eight
classifications were: (1) Federal Rules Replica; (2) Notice Pleading/Federal-Rules-
Model Procedural System; (3) Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedu-
ral System; (4) Notice Pleading/Idiosyncratic Procedural System; (5) Notice Plead-
ing/Federal Code Procedural System; (6) Fact Pleading/Federal-Rules-Model
Procedural System; (7) Fact Pleading/Idiosyncratic Rules-Based Procedural Sys-
tem; and (8) Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System. See id. at 1377-78.
Among the states with procedural systems least influenced by the federal
model, this particular sample of three provided the most optimal mix of geogra-
phy, population and ideology. Although the geographical dispersion of the sam-
ple is not ideal, the geographic reach of the study is not limited to these states. In
comparisons of the federal and state procedural standards in practice, the federal
procedural standard is observed at the level of the United States Courts of Appeals.
Accordingly, in some respects, the geographic reach of this survey extends to the
various circuit courts that collectively (although not inclusively) extend to New
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require notice pleading, the
state courts of all three of the survey states are code pleading jurisdictions.
The distinction between code pleading and notice pleading is signifi-
cant. Historically, pleadings served an ambitious purpose: they were de-
vices by which the parties framed the facts and narrowed the issues.
62
Code pleading required plaintiffs to state factual support for all elements
of each cause of action. 63 Compliance with these requirements was in-
tended not only to flesh out the extent of the pleader's knowledge of the
facts underlying the claim, but also to determine the legitimacy of the
claim itself.
64
The drafters of the Federal Rules expressly rejected the code pleading
requirement that complaints set forth facts sufficient to state a cause of
action.65 Indeed, Rule 8(a)(2) was drafted deliberately to avoid usage of
the terms "fact" and "cause of action," and the confusion they caused. In
Jersey in the east, the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean, Minnesota to the north,
Arkansas in the south and the Dakotas in the Plains. (Pennsylvania is in the Third
Circuit, which includes Delaware, New Jersey and the Virgin Islands. Illinois is in
the Seventh Circuit, which includes Wisconsin and Indiana. Nebraska is in the
Eighth Circuit, which includes Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and North
and South Dakota.) Such breadth of reach assumes, however, that the "local legal
culture," discussed infra at notes 271-84, extends beyond the boundaries of the
survey states and to the carious states within the three courts of appeals. With
regard to population, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Nebraska rank as the fifth, sixth
and thirty-eighth most populous states, respectively.
Presidential politics were used as a crude proxy for political ideology. Accord-
ing to The Almanac of American Politics, Nebraska has voted for more Republicans in
presidential elections than any other state, Pennsylvania is "one of the more Demo-
cratic states," and Illinois falls somewhere in the middle as a "presidential bell-
wether." MICHAEL BARONE, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 417, 806, 1129
(1996) (analyzing 1996 election year in light of each state's people, ratings, votes,
election results and campaign finance).
62. The Field Code, adopted by the State of New York in 1848, was the proto-
type for all practice codes for states that adopted code pleading. Pleading under
the Field Code required "a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action
in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." An Act to
Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of
This State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. LAws 521; accord CLARK, HANDBOOK 1, supra
note 40, at 22-23 (discussing characteristics of code). See generally Richard Marcus,
The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 433, 435, 463-64 (1986) (noting seeming survival of some aspects of fact
pleading from original codes).
63. See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN His-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 190 (1952) (discussing history of pleading); Mark D. Robins,
The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 637, 641 (1993)
(presenting historical backdrop to pleading under Federal Rules).
64. See Robins, supra note 63, at 641 (noting greater detail in historical plead-
ings); Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, at 916 (noting evolution of common law as
"technical pleading system designed to resolve a single issue").
65. See Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, at 922 (discussing how drafters of Federal
Rules made enormous change from codes when flexible aspects of equity were
adopted).
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Conley v. Gibson,66 a 1957 case that became the standard-bearer of notice
pleading, the United States Supreme Court held:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant
to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To
the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement
of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
67
Notice pleading epitomized the reforms accomplished by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and, particularly, the conscious departure from
common law68 and code pleading.
69
Unlike the liberal notice pleading standard allowed by the text of Fed-
eral Rule 8(a), the procedural codes and rules in the three survey states
still require the pleading of facts and causes of action. The Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure requires a "plain and concise statement of the pleader's
cause of action;" 70 the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require the
pleading of "material facts on which a cause of action ... is based;"7 1 and
the Nebraska Code of Civil Procedure requires that the complaint disclose
"facts constituting the cause of action."72 This survey sought to determine
whether, in each of these states, the textual difference between these code
pleading requirements and the federal standard of notice pleading pro-
duces a different outcome in practice. The data are presented in Section
A of Part II.
Notwithstanding the fundamental difference in pleading standards
between the federal and state courts of these three states, all three have
adopted, as part of their state procedural schemata, the federal summary
66. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
67. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
68. One commentator provides a thorough description of common law plead-
ing, including that:
Common law also evolved as a technical pleading system designed to re-
solve a single issue. When it became apparent that specific facts should
bring about specific legal results, it made sense to determine whether the
plaintiff's story, if true, would permit recovery and, if so, what facts were
in dispute. Assuming the defendant did not contest that he was properly
brought before the correct court, but still disputed the case, the common
law procedure permitted first a demurrer, and then confession and avoid-
ance, or traverse. Under single issue pleading, the parties pleaded back
and forth until one side either demurred, resulting in a legal issue, or
traversed, resulting in a factual issue.
Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, at 916.
69. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REv.
491, 494-97 (1910) (discussing function of pleadings); Subrin, Equity, supra note 8,
at 963-64 (discussing features of code pleading); Clarke B. Whittier, Notice Pleading,
31 HARv. L. REV. 5.01, 501-02 (1918) (distinguishing features of notice pleading).
70. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-603(a) (West 1992).
71. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1019(a) (West 1987).
72. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-804(2) (Michie 1995).
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judgment rule.7 3 Federal Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment
shall be rendered "[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." 74 The text of the correspond-
ing sections of the Illinois and Nebraska Codes differ from the Federal
Rule in only minor respects75 and, until 1996, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure copied the Federal Rule verbatim.76 The control data,
presented in Section B of Part II, identify the practical consequences of
textual uniformity in these same federal and state jurisdictions.
A. The Practical Consequences of Dissimilar Procedural Rules
This Section presents the methodology and the findings of a survey
that explores the practical significance of dissimilar procedural rules. In
particular, the survey evaluates the difference in practice between the
pleading standard applied by state courts under the requirements of code
pleading and the pleading standard applied by the federal courts in each
of those states under the regime of notice pleading. In the narrow circum-
stances surveyed, the findings demonstrate patterns of substantial intra-
state uniformity in practice, notwithstanding fundamental textual
disuniformity.
1. Survey Design and Methodology
The goal of this survey was to ascertain the pleading standards actu-
ally applied by certain federal and state courts, and to compare those stan-
dards between and among jurisdictions. Qualitative assessment and
comparison of pleading standards is, to be sure, a precarious undertaking.
These subjective dangers were mitigated through the design and method-
ology of the survey.
In assessing the pleading standard applied by courts, this survey was
confined to published opinions. Admittedly, a substantial number ofjudi-
cial applications of pleading standards appear in unpublished opinions. 77
This survey assumed, however, that all significant, novel or otherwise note-
73. See 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1005 (West 1992) ("Summary Judg-
ments"); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1332 (Michie 1995) (citing summaryjudgment
rule); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1035.1-.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000) (citing amended
summary judgment rule).
74. 28 U.S.C.S. § 56(c) (2000).
75. The text of the pertinent summaryjudgment rules in the Illinois and Ne-
braska Codes do not include "answers to interrogatories" among the material for
judges to consider upon motions for summary judgment. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-1005(c); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1332.
76. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1035 (citing rescinded section). A new summary
judgment rule was adopted February 14, 1996 and was made effectiveJuly 1, 1996.
See 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1035.1-.5 (citing amended statute).
77. Not all dispositive motions (even if granted) prompt a written opinion
from the court, and not all written opinions are published.
2001] 329
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worthy applications of pleading standards would be published. 78 Further,
this survey accepted (and could not control) that the published opinions
upon which the survey relies may not tell "the whole story."
79
In order to permit more meaningful comparisons among the data,
the survey focused on a single substantive category of cases: discrimination
and civil rights actions implicating race, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, age, religion or disability, including federal and state constitu-
tional litigation matters. This category of cases is referred to throughout
this Article as "topical" or "civil rights" cases. By focusing the survey on
this single category, the population of the study was reduced to a size that
permitted substantive review of all relevant published opinions. For pur-
poses of this survey, published opinions were characterized as "relevant" if
they implicated the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint.
Civil rights cases were selected because heightened pleading stan-
dards have uniquely significant substantive consequences on plaintiffs'
civil rights claims. When courts impose heightened pleading standards,
they impose a burden of making specific factual allegations. Facts to sup-
port allegations of civil rights violations are, however, more often than not,
in the hands of the defendants.80 Accordingly, the imposition of a burden
to plead specific factual allegations can be dispositive of many civil rights
claims and have a chilling effect on still others.8 1 Put another way, the
pleading standard really matters in these cases.
78. The assumption was made out of necessity, not out of confidence. See
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends
of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy ?, 50 S.C. L. REv.
235, 236 (1998) (noting controversy over increase of unpublished appellate opin-
ions); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 802 (1995) (noting court of appeals need not pub-
lish frivolous cases or cases where law is truly well-settled). See generally Lauren K.
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Liti-
gants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. Riv. 940 (1989) (discussing
problems associated with unpublished opinions).
79. This is not meant to ascribe any disingenuousness to the courts. Rather, it
suggests that all relevant facts in a given matter may not be apparent upon a stale
reading of an opinion. Indeed, scholars have noted that even judges may be una-
ware of the full reasoning behind their decisions, which are influenced by inar-
ticulable intuitions and subconscious forces. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words:
Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 75, 84-85
nn.31 & 34 (1998) (exploring why and how judges might not fully disclose reason-
ing and motivations in deciding cases).
80. See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application
to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 85, 107-108 nn.176-78 (1994) (stating
that heightened pleading standard is arguably race-specific); Eric K Yamamoto,
supra note 2, at 372 n.147 (discussing heightened fact pleading for civil rights
cases).
81. See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Plead-
ing Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 935, 949 (1990)
("As a general rule notice pleading is sufficient, but an exception has been created
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Furthermore, this category of cases was selected because the pleading
standard for civil rights plaintiffs in federal court has experienced a well-
documented (and highly controversial) evolution in the past two decades.
Notwithstanding the mandate of notice pleading under Federal Rule 8 (a),
fact pleading enjoyed a highly controversial revival in federal civil rights
cases in the 1970s and 1980s.82 Indeed, during this period, all federal
for cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts."); Brooks, supra note 80, at 108 n.80
(discussing imposition of plaintiff with heightened pleading standard); Martin B.
Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of
Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1989) (noting problems with pretrial scheme
that unfairly requires certain plaintiffs to plead specifically with facts); Marcus,
supra note 62, at 436 (noting inappropriate use of fact pleading requirements as
step towards discretionary dismissals); David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading Notice Plead-
ing, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 418 (1980) (noting evolution of fact-
conclusion pleading distinction); Evan Sanford Schwartz, A Plea for Help: Pleading
Problems in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Claims, 6 ToURo L. REv. 377, 378 (1990)
(noting that popular technique to limit civil rights claims is heightened pleading
standard); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A
Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677, 683 (1984) (discussing history of
specificity requirements in civil rights complaints); Nancy J. Bladich, Comment,
The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil Rights Cases, 45 MERCER L. REv. 839, 839
(1994) (noting that notice pleading in Civil Rights cases is under attack by federal
courts).
82. See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SEcTION 1983 LITIGA-
TION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES 20 (2d ed. 1991) (detailing requirements of
heightened pleading); Blaze, supra note 81, at 949 (noting that reasoning given by
courts for heightened pleadings in Civil Rights Act cases was dubious at best);
Brooks, supra note 80, at 108 n.180 (discussing disparate impact of heightened
pleading in Civil Rights cases on people of color); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity
in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 657 (1989)
(noting that fact pleading requirement is one way to deal with lawsuits frequently
found to be frivolous); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Divi-
sion of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1580-81 n.49 (1991) (citing examples of civil
rights cases where heightened pleading requirements existed); Louis, supra note
81, at 1027 (noting serious problems with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before
1983 amendments); Marcus, supra note 62, at 44647 (discussing courts insistence
on vigorous fact pleading in certain cases); Paul J. McCardle, A Short and Plain
Statement: The Significance ofLeatherman v. Tarrant, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 19,
20 (1994) (discussing impact of Leatherman on federal pleading in civil rights
cases); Kenneth F. Ripple & GaryJ. Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 788, 808-09 (1988) (stating no genuine justification exists for
heightened pleading in civil rights cases); Roberts, supra note 81, at 418 (discuss-
ing heightened pleading requirements in certain cases); Schwartz, supra note 81,
at 382-88 (discussing revival of heightened pleading in civil rights cases); Carl To-
bias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv.
270, 299 (1989) (discussing various civil rights cases in which heightened pleading
was required); Wingate, supra note 81, at 683 (discussing first case to announce
special pleading rule for civil rights cases); Bladich, supra note 81, at 841 (stating
that heightened pleading standards are unwarranted acts ofjudicial activism); Eric
Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 72
N.C. L. REv. 1085, 1109 (1994) (considering Leatherman's effect on federal plead-
ing in civil rights cases); Clay J. Pierce, Note, The Misapplication of Qualified Immu-
2001]
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courts of appeals applied a standard demanding factual specificity of civil
rights plaintiffs filing cases in federal court.8 3 Courts typically used one or
some combination of the following arguments to justify the heightened
pleading standard: (1) the higher standard discouraged frivolous litigation
and abuse; (2) the higher standard encouraged civil rights cases to be filed
in state courts; and (3) the increasingly large volume of cases brought
under the Civil Rights Act demanded an alternative.8" Yet, in 1993, a
unanimous United States Supreme Court held in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,8 5 that Federal Rule 8(a)
"meant what it said":
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant
to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To
the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement
of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.8 6
nity: Unfair Procedural Burdens for Constitutional Damage Claims Requiring Proof of the
Defendant's Intent, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1769, 1791 (1994) (considering implication
of recent case law on procedural burdens under Federal Rules).
83. See, e.g., Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating
plaintiffs must plead specific allegations); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765,
767 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming lower court's dismissal and stating "it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief'); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(requiring some particularity in pleading); Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995
(1st Cir. 1979) (stating courts need not "conjure up" unpled facts to support con-
clusory allegations); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating civil
rights complaint must state more than simple conclusions); Smith v. Int'l Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 592 F.2d 225, 226 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require definiteness in complaint); Uston v. Airport Casino, Inc., 564
F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding complaint must contain specific factual
allegations to support claim of conspiracy); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532
F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (" [P] laintiffs in civil rights cases are required to plead
facts with specificity."); Coopersmith v, Supreme Court, 465 F.2d 993, 994 (10th
Cir. 1972) (stating complaint must state factual basis for claim asserted); Place v.
Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1971) (stating pleading is insufficient to
state cause of action "if its allegations are but conclusions"); Jewell v. City of Cov-
ington, 425 F.2d 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating general conclusory allegations
unsupported by facts do not constitute cause of action).
84. See Brooks, supra note 80, at 108 n.180 (citing caselaw that suggested many
civil rights cases are frivolous); see also Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 922 (stating concern with
frivolous claims as reason to require civil rights cases be pled specifically); Bau-
mann et al., supra note 30, at 245 (discussing problems created by heightened
specificity requirements in Title VII pleadings, despite reasons given by courts for
more stringent standards); Blaze, supra note 81, at 950 (noting increasingly large
volume of cases brought under Civil Rights Acts as reason for exception to liberal
pleading); Marcus, supra note 62, at 436 (suggesting pleadings should enable
courts to decide cases on their merits); Wingate, supra note 81, at 684 (pointing
out reasons given by courts for heightened pleading in civil rights cases).
85. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
86. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
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Thus, civil rights plaintiffs in federal court were to enjoy the same lenient
standard of notice pleading as other plaintiffs.8 7
The evolution of the pleading standard in civil rights cases is particu-
larly appropriate for study for two reasons. First, the controversial nature
of this subset of cases suggests that the courts thoughtfully and deliberately
applied the pleading standard in the opinions that are the subject of this
review. Second, given that we know that the federal standard experienced
an evolution from notice pleading to fact pleading and back to notice
pleading, we can compare not only the standards applied by the federal
and state courts within a given state at any particular time, but also the
pattern of evolution of those standards within each jurisdiction.
The survey of the federal pleading standard imposed upon civil rights
plaintiffs is directed primarily at the opinions of the applicable federal
circuit court of appeals.88 Although the pleading standard is applied, in
the first instance, by federal district courts, the survey assumed that the
appeals courts were the more appropriate focus for a study of the jurispru-
dence of the federal courts within a given state. The opinions of the
courts of appeals educate the trial courts and provide the precedential text
from which a pleading standard is derived. Similarly, priority was given to
the opinions of the highest appeals court within each of the state court
systems. However, in order to have a sufficient population of cases from
which to draw conclusions about the pleading standard within each state,
the survey also considered the opinions of intermediate state appellate
courts (and, on rare occasions, trial courts).
To gather the data, topical and relevant opinions were reviewed and
categorized as indicative of either a "notice" or a "fact" pleading standard.
Recognizing the strongly subjective judgment reflected in each case re-
view, characterization was limited to these general categories, and no ordi-
nal judgments were made within each of these two categories.
To aid in the characterization, a concept of "badges" was adopted to
determine whether a given opinion was indicative of one standard or the
other.8 9 For purposes of classification, the badges of notice pleading
87. Significantly, however, the Court refused to consider whether a height-
ened pleading standard could still be required in situations in which an individual
government official asserted a qualified immunity defense. See id. at 166-67. A
standard of heightened pleading thus continued under those limited circum-
stances in certain jurisdictions. See generally Leon Friedman, Qualified Immunity
When Facts are in Dispute, 16 ToURo L. REv. 857 (2000). The Supreme Court then
affirmatively foreclosed the heightened pleading standard in qualified immunity
cases in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). See generally Brian P. Sharkey,
Note, Crawford-El v. Britton: The Supreme Court Re-examines the Qualfied Immunity
Defense Within the Confines of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1122 (1999).
88. In two of the three subject states, the applicable federal circuit court of
appeals sits within the state. The Eighth Circuit does not, however, regularly sit in
Nebraska.
89. The decision to use a concept of badges came while the author was read-
ing Professor Bruce Markell's article discussing the "badges of fraud" in the con-
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were: (i) using the word "notice" when describing the applicable standard;
(ii) using the word "claim" (as opposed to "cause of action"); (iii) refer-
ring to "liberal construction" of the plaintiffs complaint; and (iv) acknowl-
edging the distinct roles of motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment.
Conversely, the badges of fact pleading included: (i) using the words
and phrase "facts," "elements" and "causes of action;" (ii) demanding
.specificity" or "particularity" on each element of a claim or cause of ac-
tion; (iii) expressing dissatisfaction with "conclusory" allegations; (iv) de-
ploring the evil of "frivolous" litigation; (v) expecting plaintiffs to
anticipate and negate affirmative defenses; and (vi) discussing the merits
of the underlying claim when assessing sufficiency of allegations (often
indicating the plaintiff's burden to "establish" or "prove" something at the
pleading stage, or "weighing" and "balancing" the merits of the underlying
substantive claim). The assurance of stability in the data collected is that
the author was the sole reviewer, and the same categories were used
throughout the review.
In each of the following sections there is a state-specific description of
the significant moments in the evolution of the pleading standards-first
in the federal court, and thereafter, in the state court.90 When a "clearly
prevailing" standard is mentioned, this means that all or nearly all of the
cases within that period demonstrated the badges of that standard. Of
course, there are many periods where the corpus of opinions from a given
jurisdiction exhibit the badges of both fact and notice pleading; during
these periods of transition (or other uncertainty), the pleading standard is
referred to as "mixed." At the conclusion of each of the following sec-
tions, the data is presented in a time-series graph that demonstrates, for
each federal and state jurisdiction, the evolutionary pattern between the
standards of fact and notice pleading.
text of state adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See Bruce A.
Markell, The Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Introduction, 28 IND. L. REv.
1195, 1200 (1995) (discussing decisions dealing with or enunciating various
badges of fraud). Accordingly, the author thanks the University of Nevada-Las
Vegas School of Law for extending an interview during the law faculty recruitment
process. It is most unlikely that the author would otherwise have been reading this
fascinating article about the Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
90. "Moments" are used as a shorthand for cases that (1) establish a new stan-
dard of application; and/or (2) are widely cited for establishing a new standard of
application. This term is borrowed from Bruce Ackerman's "moments" in the field
of constitutional law. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,
99 YALE L.J. 453, 456-61 (1989) (outlining constitutional "moments"). Not all cases
specifically described in the text are "moments," however. Some are merely exem-
plary of a prevailing standard.
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2. Survey Data
a. Illinois
The State of Illinois retains a system of code pleading that has origins
in the Field Code.9 1 According to Section 2-603(a) of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure, an Illinois state court complaint must contain a "plain
and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action."9 2 Notwithstand-
ing the fundamental difference between code pleading and notice plead-
ing (under Federal Rule 8(a)), the federal and state court pleading
standards in Illinois civil rights cases have evolved in remarkable parallel
and are applied uniformly.
The pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in Illinois federal
courts is easily traced. During the 1960s, a notice pleading standard
clearly prevailed.9 3 Throughout that decade, courts routinely cited Conley,
embraced the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), and held that
complaints need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim.
9 4
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the requirement that civil rights
plaintiffs plead facts crept into the jurisprudence of the Seventh Circuit.
Federal Rule 8(a) notwithstanding, the badges of fact pleading first ap-
91. Pleading under the Field Code required "a statement of the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language, without repetition,
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended." An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and
Proceedings of the Courts of This State, ch. 379 § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. LAws 521.
The Civil Practice Act adopted in Illinois copied the Field Code, except that it
omitted the term "statement of facts." The Committee decided to omit the word
"facts" in order to minimize the controversy that had arisen in so many code states
where pleadings had been constantly attacked as setting out conclusions rather
than facts. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. CM. L.
REV. 233, 233 (1936) [hereinafter Cook, Facts] (discussing intentional departure
from traditional code language). In 1981, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
"reorganized" the Practice Act, but made purely stylistic changes. SeeAct of August
19, 1981, Public Act No. 82-280, 1982 Ill. Laws. 1381; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-101-1601 (West 1992) (providing provisions of Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure).
92. 110 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 2-603(a) (West 1983).
93. This description begins with the 1960s only because this is when topical
opinions first appear. No earlier published opinions discussing the pleading stan-
dard for civil rights plaintiffs in federal court could be found.
94. See, e.g., Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1969) (construing
pro se complaint liberally where not "wholly insubstantial or frivolous"); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 360-62 (7th Cir. 1968) (finding complaint
filed under Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging gender discrimination sufficient, not-
withstanding failure to plead certain basic facts); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529,
531 (7th Cir. 1961) (construing Section 1983 complaint liberally, finding con-
clusory allegations of due process violation sufficient); Contract Buyers League v. F
& F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (noting civil rights "complaint must
be liberally construed"); Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351, 356
(N.D. Ill. 1965) (finding complaint sufficiently satisfies liberal pleading require-
ments of rule 8(a) (2) to survive defendant's motion to dismiss).
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peared in civil rights complaints alleging conspiracies. 95 Complaints were
dismissed as insufficient to state a cause of action unless they contained
specific factual allegations about the nature of the conspiracy, the involve-
ment of each of the named defendants, and the specific conspiratorial
acts. 96 Fact pleading then spread beyond conspiracy cases; extra protec-
tions for pro se plaintiffs eroded, and courts required the pleading of facts
in lieu of so-called boiler-plate pleading.9 7
By 1985, a fact pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs clearly
had prevailed in Illinois federal courts.98 In Strauss v. City of Chica-
95. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding
complaint fails to reveal any basis under Civil Rights Act); French v. Corrigan, 432
F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (7th Cir. 1970) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint
because allegation is conclusory).
In fact, these roots can be traced back into the 1960s. See Kamsler v. Zaslaw-
sky, 355 F.2d 526, 527 (7th Cir. 1966) (finding allegations listing improprieties and
errors in state criminal trial and pretrial proceedings were insufficient to substanti-
ate conclusory allegations of conspiracy); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 873
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (recognizing duty to examine complaint for any possible grounds
for relief, but finding complaint insufficient where it had "not alleged facts").
96. See, e.g., French, 432 F.2d at 1213 ("Obviously, this allegation is conclusory
and of no aid to plaintiff absent allegations as to the acts committed by defendants
in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy.").
97. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978)
(requiring some particularized facts demonstrating constitutional deprivation to
sustain cause of action under Civil Rights Act); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969,
972 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding "boiler-plate pleading" insufficient to state claim
under civil rights statutes); Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1974)
("[T]he only elements [needed] to establish a claim for damages under the Civil
Rights Act are that the conduct complained of was engaged under color of state
law, and that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privi-
leges or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . ."); Carlisle v. Bensinger, 355
F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (dismissing allegations that prison officials
discriminated by allowing some inmates to take personal property into segrega-
tion, that some prisoners had been subjected to assaults by prison personnel, and
that prison officials discriminated against inmates because of past prison records
because plaintiffs "fail[ed] to present any factual support for these allegations"
(emphasis added)).
With regard to pro se plaintiffs in particular, an especially liberal pleading
standard was first eliminated by the Seventh Circuit. See Haines v. Kerner, 427 F.2d
71, 73 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding purely conclusory statements insufficient in com-
plaint based on Civil Rights statutes). The Supreme Court later reversed this deci-
sion, but any special protections for pro se plaintiffs were limited. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) ("[A]lthough we intimate no view whatever on
the merits[,] ... we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof.");
see also Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1980)
(stating pro se plaintiff's allegations may be liberally construed but still must be
supported by facts).
98. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that plaintiff "must set out sufficient factual matter to outline the elements
of his cause of action or claim"); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d
194, 198 (7th Cir. 1985) (utilizing Ellsworth standard) (noting that complaint must
include "operative facts"); Lowe v. Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1985);
Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff "must set
out sufficient factual matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or
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go,99 the plaintiff had filed a civil rights suit after he was allegedly struck by
a police officer while being placed under arrest without probable cause or
reasonable belief that a crime had been committed. 10 0 The district court
dismissed the complaint and the Seventh Circuit affirmed because the
plaintiff "alleged no facts to suggest that the policies of which he com-
plains actually exist."10 1 Subtly acknowledging the end of the era of notice
pleading, the court genuflected with the traditional maxims of a liberal
notice pleading standard, 10 2 but then reviewed the complaint under a
heightened pleading standard:1
0 3
The absence of any facts at all to support plaintiff's claim renders
the allegations mere legal conclusion of Section 1983 liability de-
void of any wel-pleaded facts .... Strauss did attempt to establish
the minimal facts required by including statistical summaries ....
We do not mean to imply that a plaintiff must plead in greater
detail, but merely that the plaintiff must plead some fact or facts
tending to support his allegation .... 104
Notwithstanding a certain amount of equivocation in Strauss about a fact
pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs, the opinion is widely cited by
scholars and courts (including the Seventh Circuit itself) for establishing a
heightened pleading requirement for civil rights plaintiffs in the Seventh
claim"); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing
plaintiff's claim that city policies proximately caused unlawful police conduct be-
cause plaintiff failed to allege any facts to support claim).
99. 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985).
100. See Strauss, 760 F.2d at 766 (stating facts of case).
101. Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 767 ("To further this end a court must construe pleadings liber-
ally, and mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute sufficient grounds for
a motion to dismiss."). The court also stated:
The standard a defendant must meet to have a claim dismissed for this
reason is admittedly a high one. Dismissal is improper "unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief". . . . Our conclusion today does
not conflict with the settled rule stated in Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.
Id. at 767 (citations omitted).
103. The terms "heightened pleading" and "fact pleading" are used
interchangeably.
104. Strauss, 760 F.2d at 767-69 (emphasis added); see also Benson, 761 F.2d at
338 (reviewing complaint under heightened pleading standard). Benson was ar-
gued four months before Strauss, but it was decided (by a panel that did not over-
lap with the panel in Strauss) one day after Strauss. The Benson court, too, took
great pains to acknowledge rule 8(a), "notice pleading" and Conley v. Gibson,
before applying what unmistakably is a fact pleading analysis to find that the allega-
tions of the complaint did not state a constitutional violation. See id. at 338-39
(analyzing pleading standard). The court found that a plaintiff "must 'set out suf-
ficient factual matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or claim ...." Id.
at 338 (emphasis added). The Benson court did not cite the Strauss opinion.
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Circuit. 10 5 After Strauss, and for approximately eight years, a fact pleading
standard for civil rights plaintiffs clearly prevailed in the federal courts of
Illinois.10
6
In 1993, after the Supreme Court decided Leatherman,10 7 Illinois fed-
eral courts promptly returned to a notice pleading standard. In Triad Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Robinson,10 8 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to grant a motion to dismiss based on the qualified immunity of
the defendants. 10 9 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit remarked, "[I]n this
circuit on a motion to dismiss we require no more from plaintiffs' allega-
tions of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum
and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded gener-
105. See, e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected": The Role of Causa-
tion in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1187, 1211 n.85
(1988) (noting adoption by Strauss court of heightened pleading standard); Mar-
cus, supra note 62, at 465 n.195 (citing Strauss and suggesting that "detailed plead-
ing" requirements "may tempt courts to question the factual conclusions on which
the plaintiff has rested his claims"); Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in
the Ohio Courts: An Introduction for Ohio Lawyers and Judges, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 407,
445 n.218 (1993) (noting Strauss extended "heightened pleading" to "non-immu-
nity issues such as the facts necessary to establish municipal liability"); Schwartz,
supra note 81, at 382 n.26 (noting Strauss, among other cases, has imposed a
heightened pleading standard); see also Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476
(7th Cir. 1991) (citing Strauss and noting that some civil rights cases require
heightened pleading); Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 380 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing
Strauss and noting that in circumstances where plaintiff does not allege "any spe-
cific facts beyond the immediate incident" plaintiffs claim "will not withstand a
motion to dismiss"); Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th
Cir. 1989) (citing Strauss and noting that Section 1983 complaints "that cite bare
legal conclusions that are 'wholly devoid of facts' . .. may warrant dismissal").
106. See, e.g., Caldwell v. City of Elwood, Ind., 959 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir.
1992) ("A civil rights complaint must outline a violation . .. 'and connect the
violation to the named defendants."'); Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662, 667
(7th Cir. 1992) (requiring "greater specificity" of Section 1983 plaintiff); Elliott v.
Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring "specific nonconclusory
factual allegations [establishing violation]" to avoid dismissal in constitutional tort
litigation); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding civil
rights complaint implicating involvement of head of department must be pled with
greater specificity); Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)
("A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to outline the cause of action, proof of
which is essential to recovery."); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d
194, 198 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal of complaint after scrutiny of specific
factual allegations alleging several constitutional violations).
107. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
108. 10 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1993).
109. See Triad Assocs., 10 F.3d at 494 (affirming lower court's refusal to grant
motion to dismiss). The opinion was especially important because the notice
pleading standard was re-introduced in a case involving a qualified immunity de-
fense. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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ally." 110 Since Leatherman and Triad Associates, a liberal standard of notice
pleading has clearly prevailed in Illinois federal courts.1 11
Turning to the experience in Illinois state courts, the analysis begins
again with the earliest published opinions discussing the pleading stan-
dard for plaintiffs in civil rights cases in state court. Much like the federal
court, but contrary to the fact pleading required under the Illinois Code,
the first published state court opinions suggest that civil rights plaintiffs
then enjoyed a notice pleading standard. 1 12 In the 1966 case of Clark v.
McCurdie,113 for example, the Illinois Court of Appeals was required to
determine the "sufficiency of an amended petition to abate a nui-
sance." 114 The petition alleged a violation of a state civil rights statute
because five persons were denied service at a cafe "on account of race or
color." 115 The Illinois court held:
The Petitioner is not required to make out a case which will enti-
de the petitioner to all of the sought ultimate relief but need only
raise a fair question as to the existence of the claimed right ....
Turning now to an examination of the allegations of the com-
plaint ... we find an allegation of refusal to serve by reason of
color or race, allegedly in violation of the statute. To impose
110. Triad Assocs., 10 F.3d at 497.
111. See, e.g., Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000)
("[T] he plaintiff is not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate
and overcome a defense of qualified immunity."); Patton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that complaint is suffi-
cient where court and defendant can "understand the gravamen of the plaintiff's
complaint"); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing dis-
trict court's dismissal of racial discrimination in employment claim and explaining
that complaint which simply avers that "'I was turned down for ajob because of my
race'" states claim); Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging that before Leatherman, Seventh Circuit "on occasion ... would
apply a more stringent standard for notice pleading in civil rights cases" but now
applies "same standards [it] would apply in a non civil rights case"); Sledd v. Lind-
say, 102 F.3d 282, 289 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding complaint sufficient because there
was "set of facts" that plaintiff might prove that could be "consistent with the alle-
gations in the complaint"); Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir.
1995) ("But apart from [Fed. R. Civ. P. 9] and a tiny handful of arguably appropri-
ate judicial supplements to it, a plaintiff in a suit in federal court need not plead
facts; he can plead conclusions."); Palmer v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.
201-U, 46 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It is enough to specify the wrong done
and leave [the] details to later steps . . . ."). But see Ryan v. Mary Immaculate
Queen Ctr., 188 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying "the liberal pleading stan-
dards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, standards that we now know federal
judges are not authorized to tighten up for civil rights cases," but nevertheless
finding allegations insufficient).
112. The author could find no opinions published prior to 1966 discussing
the pleading standard for civil rights complainants in state court. Accordingly, it is
unclear whether the state court had earlier (or ever) required civil rights plaintiffs
to plead facts as required by the Illinois Code.
113. 220 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
114. Clark, 220 N.E.2d at 319.
115. Id. at 320 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 13-3(c) (1961)).
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upon the petitioner the duty to negate all possible defenses that
may subsequently be invoked by the defendant would involve the
pleading of evidence .... This petition contains sufficient allega-
tions and gave enough information to indicate a possible violation of
the Civil Rights Statute.' 16
Importantly, the Illinois pleading standard is described here without refer-
ence to facts; instead, the appeals court declared that the purpose of the
complaint was merely to provide the defendant with notice and was suffi-
cient so long as it "raise[d] a fair question as to the existence of the
claimed right."117 These are, of course, badges of notice pleading.
A second illustration of the then-prevailing standard of notice plead-
ing is the Illinois Appeals Court's holding in McGill v. 830 South Michigan
Hotel.'18 In that case, also decided in 1966, the plaintiff had sued a hotel
operator, alleging in a rather conclusory fashion that unexplained rent
increases and certain threats to notify the police constituted a violation of
state civil rights statutes. 119 In determining that, although it lacked spe-
cific facts, the plaintiff's fourth amended complaint was sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss, the court stated:
Under the Civil Practice Act, pleadings are to be liberally construed
with a view toward doing substantial justice between the parties,
and no pleading is to be deemed bad in substance which shall
contain such information as shall reasonably inform the opposite
party of the nature of the claim. The pleader should allege the ulti-
mate facts to be proved and not allege the evidentiary facts which
tend to prove the ultimate facts. There is no clear distinction
between statements of "evidentiary facts," "ultimate facts" and
"conclusions of law." There is no provision in the Civil Practice
Act defining a conclusion, and a precise definition as to what
constitutes conclusions of law is impossible. 120
Like McCurdie, this description of the pleading standard in a code jurisdic-
tion is remarkable because the touchstone of the articulated standard is
whether the defendant has notice of the claim against it and because the
court eschews reliance on the pleading of facts, acknowledging that the
difference between facts and conclusions of law can be illusory. 12 1 Al-
116. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
117. Id.
118. See McGill v. 830 S. Mich. Hotel, 216 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1966) (illustrating
Illinois notice pleading standard).
119. See id. at 274-75 (noting plaintiffs allegations).
120. Id. at 276 (emphasis added) (internal case citations omitted).
121. To be sure, the court's holding is not without any foundation in code
pleading. In fact, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure contains specific provisions
that are intended to soften the harshness of fact pleading. Section 1-106 provides
that the Civil Practice Act is to be "liberally construed." See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/1-106 (West 2000). Section 2-612 expressly provides: "No pleading is bad
in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite
[Vol. 46: p. 311
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though there are few topical and relevant reported state court opinions
for approximately ten years after these 1966 decisions, the notice pleading
standard likely continued to prevail. 122
In 1977, while the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in fed-
eral court was in the midst of its transition to fact pleading, Illinois state
courts likewise introduced elements of fact pleading into their jurispru-
dence. In Morse v. Nelson,1 23 the plaintiff had filed an action against the
sheriff claiming false imprisonment and violations of federal and state civil
rights laws. 124 With untempered language, the Illinois Appeals Court up-
held the dismissal of the complaint:
[S] ubstantial averments of facts [are] necessary to state a cause of
action .... A complaint is subject to a motion to dismiss where
the well-pleaded facts do not entitle one to a recovery ....
Virtually no facts are alleged showing the unlawfulness of the ar-
rest or subsequent detention. The allegation to the effect that
plaintiff's commitment to jail was without competent authority is
a bare conclusion. The allegation that a "warrant process" . . .
was issued after the arrest does not, on its face, vitiate the lawful-
ness of the original arrest or detention .... 125
After Morse, the transition from notice to fact pleading for civil rights
plaintiffs was slow, with certain remnants of notice pleading lingering until
the mid-1980s. 126 Beginning in 1986, however, a fact pleading standard
party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet."
Id. at 5/2-612. These provisions, however, are certainly not intended to eliminate
the fundamental requirement of code pleading that imposes a duty upon plaintiffs
to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action. See Reed v. Hoffman, 363 N.E.2d
140, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (noting that state Civil Practice Act, which "abolished
the common law vigors of pleading.., does not relieve the plaintiff of his duty to
allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action"); Bauscher v. City of Freeport, 243
N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("While pleadings are to be liberally construed
... still the complaint must allege facts necessary to state a cause of action.").
122. See, e.g., Lamonte v. City of Belleville, 355 N.E.2d 70, 78 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (noting that conclusory allegation that conduct was willful and wanton was
sufficient to maintain claim against city under Illinois Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act); Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 354 N.E.2d 586, 591 (Il. App. Ct.
1976) (dismissing civil rights claims because no state action, but contractual claims
survived motion to dismiss because "primary purpose of pleading is [merely] to
inform the opposite party and the court of the nature of the action"); People ex rel.
Willis v. Dept. of Corrs., 282 N.E.2d 716, 720 (Ill. 1972) (withholding judicial ac-
tion on pro se plaintiff in case not involving pleading standard, but allowing peti-
tioner to make request for transfer pursuant to new regulation); Bauscher, 243
N.E.2d at 652 (holding that complaint challenging constitutional validity of city
ordinance should be liberally construed, but must also contain some facts).
123. 363 N.E.2d 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
124. See Morse, 363 N.E.2d at 168 (stating facts of case).
125. Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Doyle v. Shlensky, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("A
complaint fails to state a cause of action when it omits facts, the existence of which
is necessary for plaintiff to recover .... A complaint which fails to state a cause of
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 341 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
prevailed for the next several years as state courts expressly adopted the
federal court's fact pleading requirements for Section 1983 and other civil
rights plaintiffs. 1
27
action may not be cured by liberal construction .... ); Mlade v. Finley, 445 N.E.2d
1240, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("'To pass muster a complaint.., must be factually
sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized
cause of action alleged.'" (citing People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West Inc., 400
N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (Il. 1981))); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, 158 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (noting that constitutional claimants "need not set forth evidence which
may well be derived from discovery subsequent to the filing of the complaint");
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 411 N.E.2d 1030,
1038-39 (II. App. Ct. 1980) (noting that notice pleading allowed under Federal
Rules is insufficient under Civil Practice Act and instructing trial courts "to dismiss
an action . . . which fails to meet the stricter pleading requirements of the Civil
Practice Act"); Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. Mathias, 408 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980) (finding allegation that white passing rate for insurance examination was
sufficient to state Illinois civil rights claim despite court's "state of considerable
dubiety as to whether plaintiff's allegations can be sustained at trial"); Executive
Commercial Servs., Ltd. v. Daskalakis, 393 N.E.2d 1365, 1368-69 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (noting allegations of conspiracy require facts (citing Skolnick v. Martin, 317
F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1963))); Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244-
45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (construing sex discrimination complaint filed under state
law liberally and finding complaint sufficient); Uretsky v. Baschen, 361 N.E.2d 875,
882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (dismissing Section 1983 complaint because it failed "to set
forth specific illegal conduct and resultant harm"); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v..
City of Darien, 357 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding allegations of
Section 1983 violation insufficient because plaintiff "failed to allege that the de-
fendants acted with malice or to state circumstances from which malice could be
inferred").
127. See, e.g., Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 881-82 (Ill. 1991)
(holding that complaint did not state claim because, upon balancing interests,
court "conclude[d] that directing plaintiff to cease all communications with the
city council members ... did not violate plaintiff's right of free speech"); Doe v.
Calumet City, 609 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (recognizing fact pleading
standard), rev'd, 641 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ill. 1994); Drovers Bank of Chi. v. Vill. of
Hinsdale, 566 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that constitutional chal-
lenge to ordinance "will be dismissed where a thoughtful reading of the ordinance
convinces the trial court that it is plainly within the bounds of the Constitution");
Dudycz v. City of Chi., 563 N.E.2d 1122, 1126-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding
pleaded facts for equal protection violation "wholly insufficient . . . [because]
plaintiff does not establish that he and [his class] were, in fact, similarly situated so
that he was entitled to be treated in the same manner"); Towne v. Town of
Libertyville, 546 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("[I]f... there are not suffi-
cient allegations of fact to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be
granted regardless of whether it informs the defendant in a general way of the
nature of the claim against him."); Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherland, 529 N.E.2d
1091, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("[T]he notice pleading allowed in Federal practice
is insufficient in Illinois . . . [because] a plaintiff is required to make more than
broad, generalized allegations of discrimination to state a cause of action there-
for."); Loftus v. Mingo, 511 N.E.2d 203, 205, 209 (II. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that
plaintiff must plead elements of cause of action); Brown v. Michael Reese Health
Plan, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (noting that party challenging
statutory classification has "the burden of proving its unconstitutionality and must
specifically set forth in the complaint facts upon which to rebut the presumption
of unconstitutionality"); Weimann v. County of Kane, 502 N.E.2d 373, 375-76 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1986) (finding Section 1983 complaint insufficient because it pled facts
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Although not bound to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of
a federal rule in Leatherman (or the Seventh Circuit's Triad Associates opin-
ion), there is some evidence that the Illinois state courts likewise relaxed
their pleading requirements coincident with the shift in the jurisprudence
of the federal court. In 1992, prior to the Leatherman and Triad Associates
decisions, a woman appealed to the Illinois Appeals Court the dismissal of
her claims against a municipality and its police officers arising out of the
officers' response to her 911 call regarding an incident in which she was
locked out of her apartment and an alleged rapist was in her apartment
with her children. 128 The intermediate appeals court held: "To overcome
a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must assert facts supporting the allegations
of the cause of action; in other words, plaintiffs must allege facts which estab-
lish a duty, breach of that duty, and resulting injury."1 29 Requiring the
pleading of facts in support of each element of the cause of action is, of
course, a classic badge of fact pleading. However, following the
Leatherman and Triad Associates decisions, and twenty-one months after the
appeals court had rendered the opinion quoted above, the Illinois Su-
preme Court reversed and applied a more relaxed standard of pleading in
Doe v. Calumet City.
1 30
The timing is not the only indication of the influence of the federal
court decisions on the state court; the Illinois Supreme Court expressly
stated that it was re-examining the application of the state's pleading stan-
dard for Section 1983 plaintiffs "in light of the [United States] Supreme
Court's decision striking down heightened pleading standards for civil
rights litigation in the Federal courts."13 1 Significantly, however, Justice
Heiple wrote a scathing dissent (joined by Chief Justice Bilandic),13 2 and
the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in Illinois state courts has
since been in flux. Although some recent opinions of the lower state
courts have followed the mandate of Doe and exhibit the badges of notice
pleading, 133 other contemporaneous state court opinions exhibit the
relating only to one incident and not policy or custom); Tennenbaum v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank, 493 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (dismissing civil rights com-
plaint of pro se plaintiff because he failed to set forth any facts that would "place
him within special duty" exception to immunity).
128. See Calumet City, 609 N.E.2d at 692-93 (stating facts).
129. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
130. See Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d at 501 (applying relaxed standard of
pleading).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 514 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (finding cause of action for gender
discrimination on pleadings "wholly ridiculous").
133. See Mattis v. State Univs. Ret. Sys., 695 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (reversing dismissal of civil rights claims filed under state law because it was
not clear that "no facts could be set forth that would entitle the plaintiff to relief');
Murillo v. Page, 690 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("A complaint should
not be dismissed unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which
entitle plaintiff to recover."); see also Holloway v. Meyer, 726 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ill.
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badges of fact pleading. 134 The Illinois Supreme Court has not squarely
revisited the pleading standard that is applicable to civil rights plaintiffs,
and the methodology of the survey characterizes the current state court
pleading standard as mixed.
The evolution of the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in the
federal and state courts of Illinois may be demonstrated graphically as
follows:
FIGURE 1
Co Cb Z o Ct N1 ' Co tO Q CV' 01co 5
CTA7
IL
ENotice Mixed *Fact
As demonstrated above, the earliest reported opinions in both the federal
and state courts suggest that a uniform standard of notice pleading then
prevailed; this is significant, of course, because the state court standard
reflects the modeling of a standard that is antithetical to the fact pleading
that is required under the Illinois Code. 13 5 As indicated by the "mixed"
shading, the badges of fact pleading appeared first in the federal court,
and thereafter, in the state court. A uniform standard of fact pleading
clearly prevailed in both the federal and state courts by the mid-1980s.
Bound by Leatherman and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), the Sev-
enth Circuit subsequently relaxed its specificity requirement. Since that
change, certain badges of notice pleading likewise have appeared in opin-
ions of the state courts. In sum, there is persuasive evidence of substantial
intra-state uniformity, notwithstanding the fundamental differences be-
tween code pleading, which is required under the Illinois Code of Civil
App. Ct. 2000) ("The difference, if any, between [the standards for motions to
dismiss under federal and state law] is not outcome determinative.").
134. See, e.g., Murillo, 690 N.E.2d at 1037-39 (recognizing notice pleading stan-
dard but carefully scrutinizing plaintiffs factual allegations to determine if cause
of action was properly stated); Rotzoll v. Overhead Door Corp., 681 N.E.2d 156,
157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff
had "failed to present any factual basis that could potentially entitle her to judg-
ment against the defendant"); Moran v. City of Chi., 676 N.E.2d 1316, 1321-22 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) (scrutinizing plaintiffs factual allegations for sufficiency);
Scheidler v. Cook County Officers Electoral Bd., 657 N.E.2d 1089, 1093-95 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (scrutinizing plaintiffs factual allegations to determine if they met
elements of Section 1983 claim); Donnelley v. Brauer, 655 N.E.2d 1162, 1167-68
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding factual allegations insufficient to satisfy elements of
Section 1983 action).
135. No earlier published opinions could be found that would indicate when
or how the modeling first occurred.
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Procedure, and notice pleading, which is required under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
b. Pennsylvania
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also has a system of code plead-
ing that has origins in the Field Code.1 3 6 Rule 1019(a) of the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiffs to set forth "[t]he
material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based .... 137
Notwithstanding stark differences between code pleading under the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and notice pleading under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal and state court pleading standards in
Pennsylvania civil rights cases have evolved in a similar fashion. The simi-
larity is surprising in light of Charles Alan Wright's statement in 1953 that,
of the states undertaking major procedural reform since the advent of the
Federal Rules, "Pennsylvania has been influenced the least by the new con-
cepts and improved techniques first suggested in the Federal Rules." 138
Notably, Rule 1019(a) has not been amended since 1946.'1 9
The pleading standard for civil fights plaintiffs in Pennsylvania fed-
eral courts can be traced forward from 1945.140 In the earliest reported
opinion, Picking v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,14 1 the Third Circuit held that
the pleading of facts was unnecessary and, "for the protection of civil
rights, [the court endeavored] to construe the plaintiffs pleading without
regard for technicalities."' 4 2 After Picking, however, the next relevant and
topical opinions of the court did not appear until the 1960s. Throughout
the 1960s and until the mid 1970s, the standard of pleading required of
civil rights plaintiffs was mixed, as the corpus of cases demonstrate the
badges of both fact and notice pleading. 143
136. Pleading under the Field Code required "a statement of the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language, without repetition,
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended." An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and
Proceedings of the Courts of This State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. LAws 521.
137. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1019 (West 2000).
138. Charles Alan Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U.
PA. L. REv. 909, 910 (1953).
139. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1019, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1019 (noting amend-
ment history).
140. This description begins with 1945 only because that is when the first topi-
cal opinion appeared. No earlier published Third Circuit opinions discussing the
pleading standard for civil rights complainants could be found.
141. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
142. Picking, 151 F.2d at 241.
143. See Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 143 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that con-
clusory allegations in complaint alleging Civil Rights Act violations will not survive
motion to dismiss); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 519 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying
notice pleading standard (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957))); Marnin v.
Pinto, 463 F.2d 583, 584 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding allegations that prison conditions
were worse than "in ghetto areas" and food was unfit "for human consumption"
"vague and conclusory," and insufficient to state claim); Marshall v. Brierly, 461
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This period of transition ended in 1976 when the Third Circuit for-
mally adopted a fact pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs. 144 In
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,1 45 the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated
from his employment as a building inspector for the defendant municipal-
ity because he exercised his First Amendment privileges. The court held:
In this circuit, plaintiffs in civil rights cases are required to plead
facts with specificity .... In recent years there has been an in-
creasingly large volume of cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or should
be litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants, public
officials, policemen and citizens alike-considerable expense, vex-
ation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important pub-
lic policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an
F.2d 929, 930 (3d Cir. 1972) (reversing district court upon very liberal construc-
tion of barely literate pro se complaint); Carr v. Sharp, 454 F.2d 271, 272 (3d Cir.
1971) (noting plaintiffs must plead facts); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275-
76 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting that, in pro se cases, courts balance specific pleading
requirement "against the equally important polic[y] that pro se litigants not be
denied the opportunity to state a civil rights claim because of [its] technicalities");
Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1969) (requiring notice
pleading); Nygrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967) (finding complaint
"insufficient because it is broad and conclusory. Its insufficiency lies in its failure
to state facts in support of its conclusions."); United States ex reL Hoge v. Bolsinger,
311 F.2d 215, 216 (3d Cir. 1962) (granting motion to dismiss because "no facts
were alleged to support the conclusions of the complaint"); Brzozowksi v. Randall,
281 F. Supp. 306, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (applying notice pleading); Davison v.
Joseph Horne & Co., 265 F. Supp. 750, 755 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (dismissing complaint
where there are "insufficient factual averments"); Sinchak v. Parente, 262 F. Supp.
79, 88 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (noting that plaintiffs must allege facts, not conclusions);
Washington v. Official Ct. Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
("Although technically deficient in some respects, the complaint is plain and con-
cise enough. It suffices to apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim.").
144. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1976)
(acknowledging prevailing fact pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs). The
Third Circuit was one of the first federal courts in the country to formally adopt a
heightened pleading requirement for civil rights plaintiffs.
Rotolo is widely cited for establishing a heightened pleading standard in the
Third Circuit. See Blaze, supra note 81, at 952-53 (noting Rotolo court's affirmance
of heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases); Brooks, supra note 80, at 108
n.180 (noting Rotolo court's justification for heightened pleading standard as large
increase in number of cases, including frivolous cases, filed under Civil Rights
Act); Levin, supra note 20, at 1580-81 n.49 (noting Rotolo court's affirmance of
heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases); McCardle, supra note 82, at 32-
33 (noting that fact pleading standard recognized in Rotolo became "the firmly
fixed law of the Third Circuit"); Schwartz, supra note 81, at 385 (stating that Third
Circuit "reaffirmed its fact pleading requirement in Rotolo'); see also Young v. Quin-
lan, 960 F.2d 351, 358 n.17 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that per Rotolo, complaints must
be pleaded with "specificity"); Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 n.20 (5th Cir.
1985) (acknowledging Rotolo court's holding); Cummings v. Palm Beach County,
642 F. Supp. 248, 249 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (noting Third Circuit's fact standard an-
nounced in Rotolo).
145. 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976).
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early stage in the litigation, and still keep the doors of the federal
courts open to legitimate claims.
The allegations in the complaint strike us as vague and con-
clusory. They fail to indicate when, where, and how [plaintiff]
had 'exercised his First Amendment privileges,' rendering it im-
possible to determine if indeed his activity was the sort afforded
protection under the first amendment and whether it had any
relevance to the termination of his employment. The allegations
state no facts upon which to weigh the substantiality of the claim; they
do not aver the content of the alleged first amendment
exercise.1
46
Fact pleading remained the norm for civil rights plaintiffs in Pennsylvania
federal courts for the next decade.
14 7
146. Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 922-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
147. See United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 204 (3d Cir. 1980) (rec-
ognizing fact pleading as standard of pleading). In this case, a suit was brought by
the Attorney General for broad declaratory and equitable relief against allegedly
unconstitutional practices and policies of the Philadelphia Police Department. See
id. at 190. Chief Judge Aldisert held that the government's allegations of racial
discrimination in the administration of certain federally-funded programs were
insufficient:
Elimination of frivolous and insubstantial claims at the pleading stage in
cases of this nature will protect local police officials from being intimi-
dated by the threat of burdensome discovery, and a more specific com-
plaint will enable the district court to protect local governments' files
from overbroad and irrelevant inquiries ....
[A] requirement of specificity under these circumstances works no
hardship on the plaintiff. This is no more than the courts of the Third
Circuit require of a prisoner, uncounselled and unlearned in the law with
no investigators and only the most modest of legal resources, who brings
a civil rights action ....
We conclude finally that the complaint was correctly dismissed. Its
allegations of racial discrimination can only be characterized as vague,
conclusory and inconsistent. It fails to identify the specific "program or
activity" of the Police Department which has expended federal funds in
an illegal manner. It does not in any manner allege facts showing a nexus
between acts of racial discrimination and the named individual defend-
ants or between the expenditure of federal funds and incidents of police
abuse, nor does it indicate how the city qua city practiced discrimination.
Id. at 204-06 (footnotes, citations and quotations omitted); see also Ross v. Meagan,
638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[T]his court has consistently demanded that a
civil rights complaint contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the par-
ticular conduct of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs."); Boy-
kins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding it
sufficient for black student, dismissed from high school drill because of her race,
to allege conduct, act, improper motive, times and places of activity and persons
responsible, because "[f]rom [these] facts alleged [the court] can weigh the sub-
stantiality of the claim"); Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979)
(noting complaint lacked allegation of defendants' state of mind and refusing to
"reasonably infer an allegation of knowledge, intent, or recklessness"); Hall v. Pa.
State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that black bank customer's
complaint alleging civil rights and equal protection violations arising out of inci-
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In 1985, the Third Circuit again led all federal courts in changing the
pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs, this time by revisiting notice
pleading in Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority:
[T] he crucial questions are whether sufficient facts are pleaded
to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide
defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer. At the
same time, however, a court cannot expect a complaint to pro-
vide proof of plaintiffs' claims, nor a proffer of all available evi-
dence. In civil rights cases .. .much of the evidence can be
developed only through discovery. While plaintiffs may be ex-
pected to know the injuries they allegedly have suffered, it is not
reasonable to expect them to be familiar at the complaint stage
with the full range of the defendant's practices under
challenge. 1
48
However, a notice pleading standard did not again clearly prevail. Cases
following the mandate of Frazier were met with strong dissents and many
opinions in the late 1980s exhibited the pre-Frazier badges of fact
pleading.149
The next moment in the development of the pleading standard oc-
curred the day after the Supreme Court decided Leatherman, when the
dent where plaintiff was photographed pursuant to police-promoted plan that dis-
criminated based on race sufficiently stated claim because it specifically alleged
time, place and conduct of persons responsible).
148. Frazier v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
149. See Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1988)
("Our specificity rule in civil rights cases ... represents a balance between the
rights of local government officials not to be subjected to the burden of trial on
claims that are legally insufficient ... and the rights of [injured] plaintiffs ....");
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that
complaint complied with heightened pleading standard because it alleged specific
conduct, time, place and identity of responsible parties); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrews-
bury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1026 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The complaint contains no
factual allegations . . . [and] conclusory allegations cannot be accepted at face
value in [civil rights] area of the law."); Dist. Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310,
314 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding, over strong dissent from Chief Judge Aldisert, that
complaint specifically alleged violations of clearly identified liberty and property
interests through specific actions, and that suit against officials involved should not
be dismissed merely because it fails to allege which particular defendants were
personally responsible for implementation of allegedly unconstitutional personnel
policies); Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir. 1986) (suggesting
that allegation that policy-making city official conducted retaliatory and defama-
tory campaign against public employee in order to suppress employer's speech
advocating fluoridation of city's water was sufficient to state claim under civil rights
statute); Hurd v. Romeo, 752 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We cannot affirm such a
dismissal unless we can 'say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se
[prisoner's] complaint.., it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim.""); Darr v. Wolf, 767 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1985)
(noting that allegations in Section 1983 complaint against judge "should be espe-
cially specific").
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Third Circuit decided Holder v. City of Allentown. 15 0 In Holder, Judge Hig-
ginbotham wrote:
The test in reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings,
plaintiff may be entitled to relief .... The complaint will be
deemed to allege sufficient facts if it is adequate to put the proper
defendants on notice of the essential elements of plaintiffs' cause
of action.1
5 1
Since Leatherman and Holder, a notice pleading standard has prevailed for
civil rights plaintiffs in Pennsylvania federal courts. 152
In the Pennsylvania state courts, the earliest reported opinion discuss-
ing pleading standards in civil rights cases appeared in the mid 1970s. 153
Notwithstanding the rigidity of Rule 1019(a) of the Pennsylvania Code,
that first opinion, Saunders v. Creamer,154 exhibits the badges of notice
pleading. In Saunders, the lower court dismissed, for lack of factual speci-
ficity, an inmate's complaint seeking relief on grounds that prison offi-
cials' failure to place him in a community treatment program or to release
him on temporary home furloughs violated his constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, stating:
Appellant's complaint is written in broad and general terms and
is far from a model of clarity. It is doubtful that it complies with
Rule 1019 of our Rules of Civil Procedure .... [However, be-
cause] a fair reading of Appellant's complaint leads to the con-
clusion that he has imperfectly pleaded facts which, if properly
150. 987 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1993).
151. Holder, 987 F.2d at 194 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Carter v. City of Phila., 989 F.2d 117, 188 (3d Cir.
1993) ("Particularly when a civil rights violation is alleged, we should not affirm a
dismissal at the pleading stage, unless it is readily discerned that the facts cannot
support entitlement to relief.").
152. SeeAbbotv. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141,148 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Leatherman,
court concluded "the complaint easily satisfied the standards of notice pleading");
Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to speculate whether
claim would be successful and finding sufficient facts to entitle relief); Nami v.
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 68 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's dismissal because it
found facts pleaded adequate to defeat summary judgment); Loftus v. S.E. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 843 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting Leatherman "squarely
overruled" Third Circuit precedent); Moser v. Bascelli, 865 F. Supp. 249, 255 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (rejecting Circuit's "heightened pleading standard" to follow
Leatherman).
153. The author could find no relevant and topical published opinions prior
to 1975 (other than the lower court's opinion in Saunders v. Creamer, 345 A.2d 702
(Pa. 1975) discussed below). Accordingly, it is unclear whether the state court had
earlier (or ever) required civil rights plaintiffs to plead facts as required by the
Pennsylvania Code.
154. 345 A.2d 702 (Pa. 1975).
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pleaded and proved, may entitle him to relief, the demurrer
should not have been sustained. 155
Although another early decision of the state court likewise exhibits the
badges of notice pleading, 15 6 the pleading standard certainly became
mixed by the late 1970s and into the early 1980s. 15 7 Nevertheless, it is the
cases with the badges of notice pleading that are particularly significant
because they diverge from the textual standard under the state procedural
code. For example, in Brown v. Taylor 58 the court described the applica-
ble pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs as follows:
A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly
insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief .... Since
the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's
claim or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the
nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that
clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.15
9
This standard is remarkable not only because it eschews the requirement
of Rule 1019(a), which requires the pleading of facts and causes of action,
but also because it repeats verbatim the text of Federal Rule 12(b) (6), the
motion by which defendants in federal court may challenge the sufficiency
of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. 160
155. Saunders, 345 A.2d at 704-05.
156. See, e.g., Robinson v. Dep't of Justice, 377 A.2d 1277, 1278 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1977) ("If... there remains doubt as to the propriety of dismissing the peti-
tion, the demurrer shall not be granted.").
157. For cases demonstrating the badges of fact pleading, see: Lynch v. John-
ston, 463 A.2d 87, 89-90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) ("Here, Plaintiff's complaint is
bare of facts which would demonstrate an invasion of his privacy .... The same
holds true with respect to Plaintiff's bald assertions of illegal detention and
prejudice to his 'rights."'); Close v. Voorhees, 446 A.2d 728, 731-32 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982) (concluding plaintiffs allegations of simple negligence fail to state cause
of action under Section 1983); Schreiber v. Jeter, 445 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982) (dismissing Section 1983 complaint because plaintiff alleged no facts
showing constitutionally protected liberty or property interest); Law v. Fisher, 399
A.2d 453, 457 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (noting that former state employee who
brought action against state officials for improper removal from his position as
result of patronage failed to allege specifically that his injury was caused by depart-
mental policy).
For cases demonstrating the badges of notice pleading, see: Reider v. Com-
monwealth, 502 A.2d 272, 273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (adhering to liberal con-
struction of pro se complaint); and Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity v. Univ. of Pa.,
464 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (emphasizing that under fact pleading
requirements plaintiffs must give notice to defendants and summarize facts essen-
tial to supporting claim).
158. 494 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (stating facts).
159. Brown, 494 A.2d at 32-33 (emphasis added) (addressing guidelines in as-
sessing whether demurrer should be granted).
160. See Beckett v. Commonwealth, 440 A.2d 649, 650 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982)
(stating that district court refused to consider defense of mootness because "the
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By the late 1980s, approximately ten years after the Third Circuit had
formally adopted the fact pleading standard in Rotolo, fact pleading be-
came the norm in state courts as well. In Harding v. Galyias,16 1 for exam-
ple, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that "mere allegations
are not sufficient . . . [and that] [t]here must be facts alleged, which if
proven, would establish that [defendant is liable]."162 Other contempora-
neous cases required the pleading of specific facts on each element of
each cause of action. 163 In Simmons v. Township of Moon,1 64 for example,
the plaintiff had alleged that county detectives denied him his right to
counsel after a false arrest, that they had tried to psychologically coerce a
confession from him and that the arrestee subsequently committed sui-
cide. 165 The appeals court ruled that the complaint was properly
dismissed:
Simmons' Complaint, however, fails to provide specific facts nor
does it allege that the County Detectives acted with deliberate
indifference or knew or should have known that decedent had
suicidal tendencies. There are no factual averments that dece-
dent exhibited any outward signs of suicidal tendencies which
the County Detectives were aware or should have been aware of,
nor are there allegations that decedent had tried to commit sui-
cide in the past of which the County Detectives were aware.
Moreover, because Simmons admits that the intent of the
alleged constitutional violations was to procure a statement and
not to facilitate the decedent's suicide, Simmons failed to meet
the standards set forth in Colburn and Freedman for maintaining a
Section 1983 action, the trial court was correct in sustaining the
defendants' [preliminary objections] to the Section 1983
action. 166
The state court dismissed the federal claims of these state court plaintiffs
and bolstered its holding with citations to two Third Circuit cases that had
Bureau's argument... [was] based upon factual information not included in the
Petition, afortiori, it must be rejected").
161. 544 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
162. Harding, 544 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).
163. See Scott v. Willis, 543 A.2d 165, 169-70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (assessing
Section 1983 claim and concluding that claim was flawed because it lacked specific
facts); King v. City of Phila., 527 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (noting
that complaint was dismissed for failure to allege facts on essential element of
claim).
164. 601 A.2d 425 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
165. See Simmons, 601 A/2d at 431 (concluding complaint "fail[ed] to pro-
vide specific facts").
166. Id. (emphasis added); see alsoJohnston v. Lehman, 609 A.2d 880, 883
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (stating that because appellant's claim only tangentially
involved access, he must have alleged actual injury in order for his claim to be
actionable).
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been decided three years earlier in which a fact pleading standard was
applied.'
6 7
Again, close behind its federal counterpart and pre-Leatherman, the
state court pleading standard took a distinct step back toward notice
pleading in the early 1990s. In Stone & Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc. v.
Department of Insurance,168 an insurance agency filed suit seeking a declara-
tion that certain state regulations were unconstitutional. 169 The com-
plaint asserted that the statutory framework of the Department of
Insurance created a system whereby the Acting Insurance Commissioner
was involved in both the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the
agency in violation of due process. The court found the allegations con-
clusory, but sufficient nonetheless, stating: "A demurrer will not be sus-
tained unless the face of the complaint shows that the law will not permit
recovery, and any doubts should be resolved against sustaining the
demurrer."170
A second example of a case from this period exhibiting the badges of
notice pleading is Heinly v. Commonwealth.17 1 In Heinly, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court determined the adequacy of the facts pleaded by
ascertaining whether the allegations of the complaint provided the defen-
dant with adequate notice:
[A] plaintiff filing a complaint in the courts of this Common-
wealth is not required to specify the legal theory or theories un-
derlying the complaint .... If the facts as pled place a defendant
on notice that the plaintiff will attempt to prove a defendant de-
prived him or her of a federally guaranteed right while acting
under the color of state law, the mere failure to specifically plead
Section 1983 will not doom the complaint. 172
The court went on to hold that the plaintiffs complaint, although "not a
model pleading... [and] barely [meeting] the minimal pleading require-
ments," was nevertheless sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.' 73 The
timing of this spirited conversion is noteworthy; although the pleading
standard for civil rights plaintiffs in Pennsylvania federal courts was mixed,
the full retreat to notice pleading was nearly complete.' 74 Other cases
167. See Simmons, 601 A.2d at 430-31 (citing Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853
F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1988) and Colburn v. UpperDarby Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir.
1988)).
168. 616 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
169. See Stone & Edwards, 616 A.2d at 1061 (stating facts of case).
170. Id. at 1063.
171. 621 A.2d 1212, 1215-16 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (stating "Penn-
sylvania is a 'fact pleading' jurisdiction," which requires claimant to plead facts
constituting cause of action).
172. Heinly, 621 A.2d at 1215 n.5 (emphasis added).
173. See id. at 1217.
174. In fact, Holder v. City of Allentown (and Leatherman) were decided the fol-
lowing week.
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exhibiting the badges of notice pleading suggest that a more relaxed stan-
dard of pleading continues to prevail in Pennsylvania state courts.175 In
the aggregate, however, the methodology of the survey characterizes the
current state court pleading standard as mixed.
The evolution of the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in the
federal and state courts of Pennsylvania may be demonstrated graphically
as follows:
FiGuRE 2
CTA3
PA
Notice Mixed Fact
As illustrated above, the earliest reported opinions in both the federal and
state jurisdictions reveal a mixed standard of fact and notice pleading; this
is significant, of course, because the state court standard, much like the
experience in Illinois, reflects the influence of a standard that is antitheti-
cal to the fact pleading that is required under the state rules. The graph
further demonstrates that fact pleading, which was formally adopted by
the Pennsylvania federal courts in 1976, also was grafted into the state
court system, albeit ten years later. Most interestingly, the standard of fact
pleading was relaxed in 1992, after the retreat from fact pleading was well
underway in the federal courts. In sum, there is evidence here of patterns
of intra-state uniformity, notwithstanding the fundamental differences be-
tween the code pleading required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure and the notice pleading permitted under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The evidence of intra-state uniformity is similar to that
observed in the State of Illinois, although the standards of application in
Pennsylvania are staggered by a lag between federal and state adoption.
176
175. See Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1212-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (dis-
cussing prima facie standard to assess discrimination claim); Hennessy v. Santiago,
708 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (assessing whether sufficient facts
maintain claim for relief); Clark v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 691 A.2d 988, 990-91
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (finding that complaint was insufficient but applying lib-
eral pleading standard); Holt v. N.W. Pa. Training P'ship Consortium, Inc., 694
A.2d 1134, 1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (dismissing complaint on grounds of im-
munity); Diaz v. Houck, 632 A.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (holding
that although "inartfully characterized," the facts pled were sufficient).
176. The significance of the lag is analyzed later in this Article to permit con-
sideration of the control data presented in Part II(B). For information on the
survey of Illinois law, see supra notes 91-135 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the lag, see infra notes 273-302 and accompanying text.
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c. Nebraska
The State of Nebraska adopted a system of code pleading in 1867. In
1939, one year after the adoption of the Federal Rules, the Nebraska legis-
lature authorized and directed the Nebraska Supreme Court to promul-
gate rules of practice for the state courts.177 The question of whether
Nebraska would adopt rules of practice based on the federal model was
hotly debated by members of the Supreme Court of Nebraska Advisory
Committee on Rules of Practice. 178 Ultimately, the state legislature re-
jected the Nebraska Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules-based
rules. 179 As a result, the Nebraska Code still requires a petition to contain
"a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, and without repetition."' 8 0 This language is identical to
the mandate under the Field Code. 18 1
The extent of intra-state uniformity in practice in Nebraska courts is
difficult to ascertain because there are fewer than a dozen relevant and
topical published opinions by the Nebraska state courts. Nevertheless, the
cases suggest that a standard of fact pleading for civil rights plaintiffs
evolved in both the federal and state courts of Nebraska, albeit at a much
slower pace than in Illinois or Pennsylvania. Moreover, the opinions of
the federal and state courts of Nebraska still exhibit badges of fact
pleading.
In Nebraska federal courts, the relevant and topical opinions, appear-
ing first in the 1970s, demonstrate a mixed standard of pleading for civil
177. See 1939 Neb. Laws 172, ch. 30, p. 164; see also Christianson v. Educ. Serv.
Unit No. 16, 501 N.W.2d 281, 286-87 (Neb. 1993) (detailing history).
178. See Bongardt, supra note 45, at 77-81 (arguing that Nebraska should
adopt rules of pleading modeled after federal model); Harry W. Shackelford, Why
Adopt New Rules of Pleading and Practice?, 21 NEB. L. REv. 94, 97-101 (1942) (discuss-
ing Nebraska's consideration of federal model practice rules).
179. See 1943 Neb. Laws 145, ch. 63, p. 236; Comp. Stat. § 27-231 et seq. (Supp.
1941) (rejecting federal model rules).
180. NEB. REv. ST. § 25-804 (listing requirements for petition).
181. Pleading under the Field Code also required "a statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language, without repeti-
tion." 1851 N.Y. Laws 1851, ch. 479, § 1. Until 1851 the Field Code also contained
the language: "[I]n such a manner as to enable a person of common understand-
ing to know what is intended." Id. at 120.
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rights plaintiffs. 182 In Bramlet v. Wilson,183 for example, plaintiffs alleged
that the corporal punishment administered by the defendants was "exces-
sive" and caused "severe physical damage to students."1 84 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held:
Specificity sufficient to supply fair notice of the action will with-
stand a motion under rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, a complaint
should not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations
do not support the particular legal theory he advances, for the
court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if
the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory. Nor
should a complaint be dismissed that does not state with preci-
sion all elements that gave rise to a legal basis for recovery ....
Thus, as a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff
includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that
there is some insuperable bar to relief.
185
Dismissals were not, however, particularly "unusual"; even some cases con-
temporaneous with Bramlet exhibited the badges of fact pleading. 186 In-
182. For cases exhibiting the badges of notice pleading, see: Cody v. Union
Elec., 518 F.2d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 1975) (dismissing Section 1983 claim but not
Section 1981 claim when plaintiff alleged that black business customers of defen-
dant were required to pay greater security deposits than white customers solely on
account of their race); Cruz v. Cardwell, 486 F.2d 550, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1973) ("A
complaint alleging violations of civil rights should not be dismissed unless it ap-
pears to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any statement of
the facts .... Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." (citations omitted)); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d
1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1973) ("[A] prisoner's petition, no matter how inartfully
drafted, should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.").
183. 495 F.2d 714, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1974).
184. See Bramlet, 495 F.2d at 715-16 (stating facts of case).
185. Id. at 716 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
186. See Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1981) (" [P] leadings
in civil-rights cases, especially those brought pro se, are to be liberally construed.
But a well-pleaded complaint must contain something more than mere conclusory
statements that are unsupported by specific facts." (citations omitted)); McClain v.
Kitchen, 659 F.2d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that complaint alleged "no facts
to support his claim"); Guy v. Swift & Co., 612 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1980) (dis-
missing complaint because although plaintiff's "pro se civil rights pleadings are
entitled to liberal construction . . .they must set forth the claim in a manner
which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law"); Nickens
v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1976) ("We think.., that the property inter-
ests involved .. .as pleaded are so de minimis that the [deprivation] in the one
instance pleaded does not constitute such a taking of property that due process
rights are implicated."); Anderson v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., St. Louis County, 521
F.2d 420, 421 (8th Cir. 1975) (dismissing complaint because, even by liberal stan-
dard afforded pro se plaintiffs, the complaint "set[s] forth no facts in support of
their allegations"); Wilson v. Lincoln Redev. Corp., 488 F.2d 339, 341-42 (8th Cir.
1973) (dismissing complaint for failing to plead with factual specificity over strong
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deed, the survey suggests that the pleading standard was mixed from the
early 1970s through the early 1980s.
By 1986, however, a fact pleading standard clearly prevailed in the
Eighth Circuit. In Morton v. Becker,187 for example, a civil rights action
alleged that a police department failed to file a "hold order" after mistak-
enly seizing the plaintiffs car as stolen.1 88 The court reviewed the suffi-
ciency of the pleading by inquiring into the sufficiency of each element of
the claim and stated: "[W]e look now... to the elements required to state
a section 1983 cause of action." t 8 9 The complaint was dismissed because
the court "believe[d] that the factual allegations... fail[ed] to support a
sufficient causal connection. ... 190 This fact pleading standard took
hold.191
Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman seems to have
had only a minimal impact on this fact pleading standard for civil rights
plaintiffs in Nebraska federal courts. There is some evidence that, in cer-
tain cases, civil rights plaintiffs have benefited from a more relaxed stan-
dard of pleading.' 9 2 There are even more cases, however, where the
Eighth Circuit, despite (or perhaps in spite of) Leatherman, has required
civil rights plaintiffs to plead facts. 19 3 Nevertheless, the methodology of
dissent detailing specificity of allegations by tenant evicted from low income hous-
ing project); see alsoJenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1965) (stating that
plaintiffs under civil rights statute must plead facts).
187. 793 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1986).
188. See Morton, 793 F.2d at 186 (stating facts of case).
189. Id. at 187.
190. Id. at 188.
191. See Isakson v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 1993) (dis-
missing complaint because plaintiff failed to allege any facts to overcome judicial
immunity); Saunders v. Dep't of Army, 981 F.2d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating
that complaint subject to dismissal "when the affirmative defense clearly appears
on the face of the complaint" even if defense is not pleaded); Wells v. Walker, 852
F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[W]e conclude the descriptions of defendants'
conduct in the complaint belie their characterization as anything other than ordi-
nary negligence ... ."); Harpole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 926-
27 (8th Cir. 1987) (dismissing Section 1983 complaint because facts alleged failed
to reveal breach of affirmative duty under state law).
192. See Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (re-
versing dismissal of male employee's complaint against employer for sexual harass-
ment under Title VII because "[a] lthough the complaint is not a model of clarity,
we think Schmedding has alleged sufficient facts ... to state a claim that he was
being harassed 'because of sex"'); Harris v. St. Louis Police Dep't, 164 F.3d 1085,
1087 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating there was no "heightened pleading" requirement and
that allegations are sufficient where they call defendants' liability "into question");
Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, .671 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
Leatherman, albeit somewhat dubiously); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19
F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claim
against former employer); see also Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d
924, 928 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing dismissal of discrimination complaint and ap-
plying liberal, notice pleading standard).
193. See Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying height-
ened standard of pleading to claim filed under Violence Against Women Act, with-
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this survey characterizes the federal court pleading standard as mixed
since 1998.
The pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in Nebraska state
courts also can be traced, albeit with a much smaller population of cases
than any other state or federal jurisdiction examined in this survey. First,
as in Pennsylvania and Illinois, the earliest decisions of the state courts of
Nebraska, dating from 1957 through 1992, exhibit badges of notice plead-
ing.1 94 During this period, the few reported cases suggest that "pleadings
[were] liberally construed"'9 5 and that the requirements to plead "facts"
and "causes of action" were relaxed. In Maldonado v. Nebraska Department of
Public Welfare,1 96 for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that
even though the plaintiff's complaint did not cite Section 1983 "in any
manner," the complaint was sufficient to state a claim and would survive a
motion to dismiss. 1
9 7
In 1993, seven years after the Eighth Circuit had adopted a fact plead-
ing standard for civil rights plaintiffs, the Nebraska state courts did the
out mention of Leatherman); id. at 1344 (Fagg, J., dissenting) ("Because my
colleagues use the lack of details inherent in notice pleading prematurely to dis-
miss Doe's complaint, I dissent."); Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist.,
133 F.3d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging Leatherman, but choosing "not
[to] apply a standard of heightened specificity . . . in cases alleging municipal
liability under Section 1983"); Walker v. M.D. Reed, 104 F.3d 156, 157-58 (8th Cir.
1997) (dismissing pro se complaint for lack of specificity, without mention of
Leatherman); id. at 158 (Arnold, Morris Sheppard, J., dissenting) (intimating that,
although discussing "duty to construe pro se complaints liberally," court actually
"erected a heightened pleading standard in this pro se case, a practice specifically
disapproved of in Leatherman"); Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 779-
80 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing dictum in Leatherman and subjecting complaint for dam-
ages against government officials to heightened standard of pleading); Reeve v.
Oliver, 41 F.3d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (dismissing Section 1983 complaint for
lack of specificity, without mention of Leatherman); Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151,
1153 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).
194. See Wichman v. Naylor, 487 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Neb. 1992) (requiring Sec-
tion 1983 claimant to plead factual allegations of "deprivation of a plaintiff's
right(s) secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States... under color
of law"); Slusarski v. County of Platte, 416 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Neb. 1987) (conclud-
ing petitioner stated sufficient facts, although many specifics were not pleaded);
Parriott v. Drainage Dist. No. 6, 410 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Neb. 1987) (reversing demur-
rer because petitioner sufficiently pleaded facts); Maldonado v. Neb. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 391 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Neb. 1986) (stating that sufficiently pleaded facts,
and not theory of recovery, states cause of action); Jones v. Vill. of Farnam, 119
N.W.2d 157, 160 (Neb. 1963) (affirming demurrer, court accepted pleaded facts,
but not legal conclusions set forth in complaint); Patrick v. Bellevue, 82 N.W.2d
274, 281-82 (Neb. 1957) (noting that claim does not need to refer to constitutional
provisions violated if sufficient facts are pleaded).
195. See Slusarski, 416 N.W.2d at 214 ("[W]e are bound by the rule that plead-
ings are to be liberally construed . . ").
196. 391 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1986).
197. See Maldonado, 391 N.W.2d at 108 (applying liberal pleading standards);
see also Patrick, 82 N.W.2d at 281 (stating that plaintiffs "were not required to make
reference to the constitutional provision in their pleadings to have the benefit of it
if the facts proven were sufficient to justify the application of it for their benefit").
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same. In Christianson v. Education Service Unit No. 16,198 a suit was filed on
behalf of mentally handicapped individuals who allegedly had suffered
physical, sexual or emotional abuse while enrolled in a school. 199 The
complaint was dismissed for failure to plead the claim with sufficient speci-
ficity, and the Nebraska Supreme Court held:
The purpose of the specific pleading requirement in civil rights
actions is to enable the courts to weigh the substantiality of the claim
and to identify and dismiss frivolous suits .... In the present
cases, the plaintiffs pled that the times they were allegedly abused
included virtually the entire time each plaintiff attended the...
school. The plaintiffs were unable to plead the identities of their
abusers beyond the allegation that one or more of several indi-
viduals performed their abusive acts. Such pleading does not
meet ... this state's code pleading requirements. 20 0
In accord with Christianson, Nebraska state courts have required civil rights
plaintiffs to plead facts with specificity since 1993.201
The evolution of the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs in the
federal and state courts of Nebraska may be illustrated graphically as
follows:
FiGURE 3
4" Nq N N N N NN
CTA8
NE
D Notice Mixed Fact
Even from the few reported opinions in the federal and state jurisdictions,
it is clear that the state court standard, as in both Illinois and Pennsylvania,
reflects the influence of a standard that is antithetical to the fact pleading
that is required under code pleading. Indeed, all of the early reported
opinions of the state court permitted notice pleading by civil rights plain-
tiffs. The graph further demonstrates that fact pleading clearly prevailed
in the Nebraska federal courts by the mid-1980s, and then was grafted into
198. 501 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1993).
199. See Christianson, 501 N.W.2d at 285 (stating facts of case).
200. Id. at 290-91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
201. See Sanitary & Imp. Dist. No. 57 v. City of Elkhorn, 536 N.W.2d 56, 64
(Neb. 1995) (requiring petitioner to allege special or particular injury - not gen-
eral injury); see also Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) ("[F]acts are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action [only] when they are a narrative of events,
acts, and things done . . .which show a legal liability of the defendant to the
plaintiff.").
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the state court, albeit several years later.2 0 2 Finally, unlike Pennsylvania
and Illinois federal and state courts, the badges of fact pleading still ap-
pear in both the federal and state courts of Nebraska, the mandate of
Leatherman (upon the federal court) notwithstanding.
B. The Practical Consequences of Uniform Procedural Rules
This Section presents the methodology and findings of the survey's
control group, which explores the practical significance of textually uni-
form procedural rules in the three subject states. In particular, this data
captures the difference, in practice, between applications by the federal and
state courts of certain identical (or nearly identical) language controlling
the movant's evidentiary burden upon a motion for summary judgment.
The findings of this survey suggest that there is substantial intra-state uni-
formity, though the practical consequences of uniform formal rules may
be less predictable than one might expect.
1. Control Survey Design and Methodology
The first control group was designed to measure whether the federal
and state courts within each of the three subject states uniformly applied
an identical (or nearly identical) provision of their summary judgment
rules. Although all three subject states are code pleading jurisdictions, the
federal and state courts in all three states have summary judgment rules
that are identical (or nearly identical) to the Federal Rule.20 3 Indeed, the
text of the corresponding sections of the Illinois and Nebraska Codes dif-
fer from Federal Rule 56 only in very minor respects20 4 and, until 1996,
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure copied the Federal Rule verba-
tim.205 The survey was designed to determine whether the federal and
state courts within each of these states applied the rules uniformly in
practice.
When assessing the standard applied by courts, the survey was again
confined to published opinions of the federal and state courts. For pur-
poses of this control survey, opinions were "relevant" when they implicated
the movant's burden of production upon a motion for summary judg-
ment. Classification of the data was straightforward because opinions were
reviewed to determine only whether the movant had "some" or "no" evi-
202. The significance of the lag is analyzed later in this article to permit con-
sideration of the control data presented in Part II(B). See infra notes 273-302 and
accompanying text.
203. In light of the fact that these three states are considered among those
least influenced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this textual uniformity is,
in and of itself, a significant observation about textual uniformity and about the
influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Oakley & Coon,
supra note 46, at 1369 (discussing influence of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
204. For a discussion of the Illinois Code, see infra note 229 and accompany-
ing text.
205. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Code, see infra note 243 and accom-
panying text.
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dentiary burden. Unlike the subtle and subjective identification of plead-
ing standards, whether a court required "some" or "no" evidentiary
showing on the part of the movant was readily apparent from the opinion.
This particular aspect of summary judgment jurisprudence was sur-
veyed because this burden was carefully articulated by the Supreme Court
in 1970, but then was fundamentally redefined in 1986.206 The control
survey was designed to capture the effect of the latter decision of the Su-
preme Court on not only the federal courts, which were bound by the new
interpretation, but also the state courts, which were not bound by the deci-
sion but operated under a textually uniform rule. The nature of this par-
ticular inquiry required no topical limitation. Unlike the heightened
pleading standard for civil rights cases, the new summary judgment stan-
dard was neither a reaction to a particular substantive category of cases,
nor was its application limited thereto.20 7 Hence, the control data is not
limited to civil rights cases.
A motion for summary judgment is to be "made and supported as
provided in this rule."2 118 Until 1986, federal case law treated this ambigu-
ously worded requirement in the same terms as it would apply to a movant
generally-as a requirement that the movant carry the burden of proof on
the subject of the motion.2 0 9 The leading case prior to 1986, Adickes v.
206. See Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts
at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 191 (1987) (noting impact of Celotex on sum-
mary judgment procedure); Gary T. Foremaster, The Movant's Burden in a Motion
for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 731, 739 (1987) (same); Jack H.
Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Stan-
dards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 776-77 (1988) (detailing Celotex's influence in
determining parties' burden); Gregory A. Gordillo, Summary Judgment and Problems
in Applying the Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 263, 273-74 (1994)
(recognizing problems created in liberal use of summary judgment); John E. Ken-
nedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress
and the Evidentiary Problem Under Rule 56, 6 REv. LITIG. 227, 234-46 (1987) (survey-
ing Supreme Court precedent in determining evidentiary standard for summary
judgment); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 206-07
(1993) (discussing increasing use of summary judgment in federal employment
discrimination cases); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary
Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 64 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court
action of "redefining the moving party's initial burden" in Celotex); Eric K. Yama-
moto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of the Celotex Trilogy, 12
U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1990) (discussing impact of Celotex and federal law on
Hawaii state court summary judgment procedure); Gerald N. Capps, Note, Civil
Procedure-Requirement of Affirmative Evidence by Party Moving for Summary Judgment-
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 831, 843-45 (1987) (discussing burden
on moving party created in Celotex).
207. For a discussion of the rationale for applying a heightened pleading stan-
dard to civil rights plaintiffs, see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
209. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970) (noting "the party
for summary judgment has the burden to show he is entitled to judgment under
established principles").
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S.H. Kress & Co., 2 10 involved a conspiracy claim arising out of the refusal
of luncheonette service to, and the subsequent arrest of, a white civil rights
worker in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 2 11 The conspiracy claim was premised
on an allegation of concerted activity between a private actor, S.H. Kress,
and state actors, the police who arrested Ms. Adickes for vagrancy. 2 12 The
record contained allegations that the arresting policeman was inside the
store when service was refused, although no evidence was presented by the
plaintiff as to any conspiratorial activity other than the policeman's physi-
cal presence. 21 3 The defendant store sought summary judgment on the
grounds that "uncontested facts," including the unrebutted affidavits of
the store manager and several police officers, pointed against a conspiracy
and that the plaintiff had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support
the existence of the conspiracy. 2 14 The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment, stating, "The moving party . . . [has] the burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes
the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party."2 15 The Supreme Court denied the motion because the
affidavits of record did not foreclose a possible inference of a conspiracy
by the jury from the fact that the policeman was present at the time that
service was refused. 21 6
In 1986, sixteen years after Adickes, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett2 17 to readdress the defendant's evidentiary
burden when moving for summary judgment. 2 18 In Celotex, the adminis-
tratrix of the plaintiffs estate had filed suit against an asbestos manufac-
turer, alleging in a wrongful death action that the decedent had been
exposed to asbestos manufactured by the defendant. 2 19 After discovery,
the defendant moved for summary judgment, but did not file an affidavit
in support of its motion.220 Instead, the defendant's motion asserted sim-
ply that there was no evidence in the record, as established through discov-
ery, that the decedent had been exposed to a product manufactured by
the defendant. 22 1 A strict application of Adickes would, for all practical
210. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
211. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 149 (stating facts of case).
212. See id. at 149-50 (stating conspiracy claim).
213. See id. at 153-57 (reviewing grant of summary judgment).
214. See id. at 153 (detailing defendant's argument).
215. Id. at 157.
216. See id. at 157-58 (noting lack of affidavits weakened respondent's case
and did not foreclose possibility that policeman conspired with luncheonette
employee).
217. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
218. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (stating "Rule 56(e) permits a proper
summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary mater-
ials ... except the mere pleadings themselves").
219. See McGinley, supra note 206, at 223-24 (detailing facts of Celotex).
220. See id. (same).
221. See id. (noting Supreme Court required movant to point out absence of
evidence).
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purposes, have defeated any prospect of summary judgment because
under Adickes, the defendant would have had to establish non-exposure (at
all points in the decedent's life) to foreclose the possibility of a plaintiff's
verdict at trial. The district court, however, granted summary
judgment. 222
With an unconvincing nod to the continued viability of the Adickes
standard, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and recast the movant's
burden of production to comport with the ultimate burden of proof that
the movant would have at trial. 22 3 As a result, Celotex still conformed to
the requirement that a movant bear the ultimate burden for his or her
motion. The Court, however, focused the critical inquiry on the question
of the burden of production that a movant must satisfy to shift that inter-
mediate burden to the nonmovant to establish his or her right to go to
trial.2 24 After Celotex, a movant who does not carry the ultimate burden at
trial bears a far lower initial burden than under Adickes.225 Indeed, a mov-
ing party may prevail at summary judgment having "made no effort to
adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its
motion."226
The consequence of the shift from Adickes to Celotex was significant
and, in certain respects, even measurable. One study concluded that prior
to Celotex, only 1.5% of all civil cases were disposed of by summary judg-
ment.227 A more recent survey suggests that this procedural device now
disposes of as many as one-third of certain types of federal civil cases.228
222. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed on a 2-1 decision, holding that the defendant had no affirmative duty
to negate the possibility that the decedent had been exposed to the defendant's
product. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
223. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325 (noting moving party must show "ab-
sence of evidence").
224. See id. at 327 ("Rule 56 must be construed with due regard ... for the
rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate . .. prior to
trial ... that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.").
225. See id. at 323 (noting Rule 56 does not require moving party to support
motion by affidavits).
226. See id. at 321-23 (disagreeing with Court of Appeals).
227. See William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judg-
ment Rule, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 449-57 (1977) (detailing study based on cases filed
in United States District Court for Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
for fiscal year ending June 30, 1970); see also Steven Alan Childress, Standards of
Review, 29 Loy. L. REv. 851, 854 (1983) (telling infamous story about sign in office
of district judge in Fifth Circuit that says, "No spitting. No summary judgments").
This interpretation of Rule 56 was consistent with the vision of Charles Clark.
See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 40, at 319 (" [T] he remedy, while important for the
disposal of cases where the opponent has no real defense on the facts, is very far
from universal in its applicability. In fact in the case of a real dispute, there is no
substitute anywhere for a trial.").
228. SeeJanet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 524 (1991) (citing estimate from Ad-
ministrative Office of United States Courts that reveals thirty-five percent of civil
cases are disposed of by summaryjudgment); see also Paul W. Mollica, Federal Sum-
[Vol. 46: p. 311
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 362 2001
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMIrrY
Hence, like the selection of civil rights cases upon examination of the
pleading standard, the focus here was on the application of a new inter-
pretation of a rule that had material consequences.
Each of the sections that follow discusses a movant's evidentiary bur-
den for summary judgment in both federal and state court. Each section
first discusses the application of the Supreme Court's re-interpretation of
the federal summary judgment standard on movants in federal court. The
sections then address whether (or when) the state court incorporated the
revised federal court standard into its own jurisprudence under an identi-
cal (or nearly identical) state court rule.
2. Control Survey Data
a. Illinois
Section 1005(c) of the Illinois Code differs from the federal rule only
in that it does not expressly include consideration of "answers to interrog-
atories" upon motions for summary judgment.229 This variance is insignif-
icant in practice, as the Illinois state courts routinely consider answers to
interrogatories on these motions. 230 Under these nearly identical federal
and state summary judgment rules, the standards are applied uniformly by
the federal and state courts. Indeed, summaryjudgment movants in both
federal and state courts have experienced a shift from an Adickes-like stan-
dard to a Celotex-like standard, albeit with a lag between federal and state
adoption.2 31
Prior to 1986, the Adickes standard clearly prevailed in Illinois federal
courts. 2 3 2 In Cedillo v. International Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers,
Local Union No. 1,233 for example, the Seventh Circuit held that "jt]he
maiyJudgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 141, 143-44 (2000) (noting three-fold
increase from 1973 to 1997 in proportion of summary judgment cases in Federal
Reporter); Patricia M. Wald, Summay Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1897, 1931(1998) (remarking that dismissals are often mislabeled and more accurately
should be labeled summary judgments).
229. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1005(c) (West 1992).
230. See Estate of Henderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 541 N.E.2d 805, 807 (IIl. App.
Ct. 1989) ("Illinois case law clearly allows answers to interrogatories to be treated
as affidavits for summaryjudgment purposes .. "); Komater v. Kenton Ct. Assocs.,
502 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that where movant fails to pro-
vide evidentiary support for summary judgment motion, opposing party may rely
upon his complaint or answer to establish triable issues of fact); Sirens v. Clausen,
328 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (equating answers to interrogatories with
discovery depositions and affidavits pursuant to Illinois rules).
231. For further discussion, see infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
232. See Herman v. Nat'l Broad. Corp., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) (cit-
ing Adickes); Yorger v. Pitt. Coming Corp., 733 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (7th Cir. 1984)
(discussing burden upon movant to establish absence of genuine issue of material
fact); Hadley v. County of DuPage, 715 F.2d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing
Cedillo); Cedillo v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers, Local Union
No. 1, 603 F.2d 7, 11 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970)).
233. 603 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1979).
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party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing
the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judg-
ment in his favor." 234
Four months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex, how-
ever, the Seventh Circuit applied a new standard that essentially elimi-
nated the production burden for summary judgment movants. In
American Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Illinois,235 the Seventh Circuit introduced
the new standard, holding:
[I]f the plaintiff fails to obtain admissible evidence with regard to
an essential issue that the plaintiff has the burden of proving, the
defendant can obtain summary judgment without putting in his
own evidence. For it is clear in such a case that the plaintiff can't
win at trial, and the purpose of summary judgment is to head off
trials the outcome of which is foreordained.2 36
Thereafter, the standard was bolstered, of course, by the Supreme Court's
Celotex opinion, and, since then, the American Nurses'Ass'n/Celotex standard
has consistently been applied by the Illinois federal courtS. 2 3 7
Illinois state courts experienced a similar shift, although a few years
after their federal counterpart. Prior to 1989, Illinois state courts had ap-
plied rules, including:
[the] fundamental rule that it is the burden of the party moving
for summary judgment to establish that there are no genuine is-
sues of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law .... Only where the movant has made some evi-
dentiary showing which refutes the allegations made must the
party opposing summary judgment present counteraffidavits. 238
234. Cedillo, 603 F.2d at 11; accord Hadley, 715 F.2d at 1241 (quoting same).
235. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
236. Am. Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 729-30. The Seventh Circuit's opinion re-
lied heavily on the reasoning in Judge Bork's dissent in Catrett v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754
F.2d 1336, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1985) (entering summary judgment on plaintiff's Sec-
tion 1983 claim even though defendant did not affirmatively establish non-exis-
tence of conspiracy).
237. See Draghi v. County of Cook, 184 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing
Celotex); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Cornfield and
Celotex); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.
1993) (requiring non-movant to identify specific facts which establishes genuine
triable issue); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir.
1990) (citing and applying Celotex standard).
238. Becovic v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 469 N.E.2d 1379, 1387-88 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984); see also Komater v. Kenton Ct. Assocs., 502 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) ("[Elven where the party opposing the motion fails to file counteraf-
fidavits, the movant is not entitled to summary judgment unless his motion and
supporting affidavits establish his right to judgment as a matter of law."). But see
Kimbrough v. Jewel Co., 416 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (providing early
indication of Celotex-like standard, where plaintiff was "required to present some
factual basis that would arguably entitle her to a judgment").
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This "fundamental rule," which modeled the Adickes standard, was aban-
doned in 1989 by the Illinois state courts in Estate of Henderson v. W.
Grace Co.,239 a products liability action alleging that an employee of the
defendant died from exposure to asbestos. Noting that the facts of this
case were "substantially similar" to Celotex, and that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 was similar to the state code provision, the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that summary judgment was properly granted for the de-
fendants because the plaintiff had insufficient evidence that the defen-
dant's product was involved. 240 Since that case, the Celotex-like standard
has consistently been applied by the Illinois state courts:
The moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter
of law where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of the case for which the non-
moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) .... In this case plaintiffs may not resist a
motion for summary judgment, on an issue for which they have
the burden of proof, by arguing that it is up to movant to negate
their case.24 1
Thus, after a lag of about three years, the Illinois federal and state courts
again were in lockstep.
242
b. Pennsylvania
Until 1996, Pennsylvania Rule 1035 copied verbatim the federal
rule.24 3 Under the identical federal and state summary judgment rules,
the standards were applied uniformly by the federal and state courts.
Summary judgment movants in both federal and state courts experienced
a shift from an Adickes-like standard to a Celotex-like standard, albeit (like
the State of Illinois) with a lag between federal and state adoption.
Prior to the Supreme Court's Celotex decision, the federal courts in
Pennsylvania steadfastly applied the Adickes standard to movants for sum-
239. 541 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
240. See Estate of Henderson, 541 N.E.2d at 808 (discussing basis of holding).
241. Swisher v.Janes, 606 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). See, e.g., Rice v.
AAA Aerostar, Inc., 690 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (noting two in-
stances warranting summary judgment); Rotzoll v. Overhead Door Corp., 681
N.E.2d 156, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (describing standard for grant of summary
judgment).
242. The lag is real and not explained merely by the fact that no reported
opinions discussed the standard in the interim. Throughout this three-year pe-
riod, the Illinois Appeals Courts routinely applied the old Adickes-like standard.
See, e.g., Guthrie v. Zielinski, 541 N.E.2d 178, 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (applying
Adickes-like standard to summary judgment motion); Kaplan v. Berger, 539 N.E.2d
1267, 1269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (same); Competitive Food Sys., Inc. v. Laser, 524
N.E.2d 207, 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (same); Schwaner v. Belvidere Med. Bldg.
P'ship, 508 N.E.2d 522, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (same); 502 N.E.2d at 1298 (same).
243. For the text of the 1996 amendment to the Pennsylvania rule, see infra
note 257 and accompanying text.
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mary judgment. In Maldonado v. Ramirez,2 44 for example, the Third Cir-
cuit held, in an opinion released only months before the Celotex decision,
that:
Rule 56 only requires a response to those motions for summary
judgment made and supported as required. If "evidentiary mat-
ter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no op-
posing evidentiary matter is presented." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) Ad-
visory Committee Note (1963) .... [T]he Supreme Court has
stated that a response is not essential to defeat a motion that does
not satisfy the movant's initial burden. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970).245
But, of course, the federal courts in Pennsylvania were obliged to, and
in fact did, follow Celotex in applications of Federal Rule 56. Indeed, on
the next occasion that the Third Circuit addressed the burden of a movant
for summary judgment, the court held, in Falcone v. Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries, Inc.,246 that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law where "the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing of
an essential element of her case." 247 Subsequently, the Celotex standard
has been widely employed in the Third Circuit.248
In the Pennsylvania state courts, however, the movant carried an
Adickes-like evidentiary burden upon a motion for summary judgment for
some time after Celotex and Falcone. In Metal Bank of America, Inc. v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America,249 for example, the court required "a prima facie
showing by the party seeking summary judgment, i.e., the production of
enough evidence to demonstrate such party's entitlement to ajudgment if
evidence were uncontroverted at trial, shifts the burden of producing evi-
dence to the party opposing the motion." 2
50
Approximately two years after Celotex and Falcone, the first indication
of a Celotex-like standard surfaced in the state court. In Eckenrod v. GAF
244. 757 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1985).
245. Maldonado, 757 F.2d at 50.
246. 805 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986).
247. Falcone, 805 F.2d at 118 (affirming summary judgment because employee
failed to demonstrate consideration binding his employer to alleged promise not
to terminate without warnings); see also Spangle v. Valley Forge Sewer Auth., 839
F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[D]efendant's proffer [of affidavits] was superfluous
... [because] the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential
element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof.").
248. See, e.g., Estate of Zimmerman v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 168 F.3d 680,
684 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Celotex); County Floors, Inc. v. P'ship Composed of
Gesper & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); In re Phillips Petroleum
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1243 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
249. 520 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1987).
250. Metal Bank of Am., 520 A.2d at 494.
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Corp.,25 1 a case with facts remarkably similar to those in Celotex, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court held:
Summary judgment [for defendants] is proper when the plaintiff
has failed to establish that the defendants' products were the
cause of plaintiff's injury .... Upon careful scrutiny of the re-
cord, we must uphold the trial court's granting of the motions
for summary judgment in favor of [defendants]. We acknowl-
edge that the facts establish that the decedent on occasion was
exposed to asbestos; there is no evidence, however, as to the reg-
ularity or nature of the decedent's contact with asbestos ....
The mere fact that appellees' asbestos products came into the
facility does not show that the decedent ever breathed these spe-
cific asbestos products or that he worked where these asbestos
products were delivered . . . . Absent testimony of record that
identifies appellees' products as being present in the furnace,
there is not even a reasonable inference that appellant was ex-
posed to appellees' asbestos products. 252
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in Eckenrod,
but the new standard immediately took hold, as the Eckenrod/Celotex stan-
dard was routinely applied thereafter. 253
Interestingly, when introducing this Celotex-like standard into its state
court jurisprudence, the Eckenrod court acknowledged a departure from
earlier state case law, but made no mention of the Supreme Court's Celotex
decision. 254 Nearly eight years after the Eckenrod decision, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court finally addressed the issue, finding the reasoning
of Celotex "persuasive" and formally adopting Celotex.255 That opinion was
one of only three reported opinions of all of the Pennsylvania state courts
ever to cite Celotex.256 Meanwhile, also in 1996, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture amended the state summary judgment rule. Among other changes,
the new rule states that a party may move for summary judgment where
251. 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. 1988).
252. Eckenrod, 544 A.2d at 52-53.
253. See, e.g., Myers v. Penn Traffic Co., 606 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 1992)
("This 'assure [s] that the motion for summary judgment may 'pierce the pleading'
and . . . require[s] the opposing party to disclose the facts of his claim or de-
fense."'); Godlewski v. Pars Mfg. Co., 597 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. Super. 1991) ("[I]f a
defendant is the moving party, he may make the showing necessary to support the
entrance of summary judgment by pointing to materials which indicate that the
plaintiff is unable to satisfy an element of his cause of action.").
254. See Eckenrod, 544 A.2d at 52 ("Therefore, a plaintiff must establish more
than the presence of asbestos in the workplace.").
255. See Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (Pa. 1996) (citing
Celotex).
256. Similarly, the Supreme Court's Adickes decision had been cited in only
six reported opinions of all Pennsylvania courts and, in all but one instance, only
for its Section 1983 jurisprudence. See Larsen v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 602 A.2d
324, 329 (Pa. Super. 1991) (discussing summary judgment standard).
HeinOnline  -- 46 Vill. L. Rev. 367 2001
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to
produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which
in ajury trial would require the issues to be submitted to ajury."2 57 The
state legislature, thus, effectively codified the Celotex standard.
In sum, after a two-year lag, there was a uniform summary judgment
standard applied in practice by the federal and state courts of Penn-
sylvania. Several years thereafter, the standard applied in practice by the
state courts (and by the federal courts) was codified by the state
legislature.
c. Nebraska
Section 25-1332 of the Nebraska Code, like the Illinois Code provi-
sion, differs from the federal rule only in that it does not expressly include
consideration of "answers to interrogatories" upon motions for summary
judgment. This variance (from the federal rule) is insignificant in prac-
tice, as the Nebraska state courts routinely consider answers to interrogato-
ries on these motions. 258 Surprisingly, under these nearly identical
federal and state summary judgment rules, there is intra-state dis-
uniformity in Nebraska because movants for summary judgment face dif-
ferent standards in federal and in state court.
Prior to Celotex, the Nebraska federal courts imposed a production
burden upon movants for summary judgment. In Kegel v. Runnels,2 59 a
case decided less than two weeks prior to Celotex, the Eight Circuit reversed
a district court order granting a motion for summary judgment for de-
fendants in a medical malpractice case, where there was no evidence intro-
duced by either party as to an essential element of the plaintiffs claim.
Consistent with Adickes, the Eighth Circuit held that it was the movant's
burden to proffer affirmative evidence to disprove the element rather
than vice versa. 260
Even after the Supreme Court decided Celotex, the Nebraska federal
courts seemed reluctant to adopt the new standard for Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. Indeed, even a year later, the Eighth Circuit applied
the Adickes standard in Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational,
257. PA. R. Civ. P. 1035.2, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1035 (West 2000); see also
Order Amending Rule 1035 promulgated Feb. 5, 1996, amendments effective July
1, 1996 (noting changes).
258. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Buffalo County
Bd. of Equalization, 500 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Neb. 1993) (affirming grant of summary
judgment based in part on interrogatory); DeCamp v. Lewis, 435 N.W.2d 883, 885
(Neb. 1989) (same); Brierly v. Federated Fin. Co., 97 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Neb. 1959)
(same); Hennek v. Lexington State Bank & Trust Co., No. A-92-407, 1994 WL
388018, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. July 26, 1994) ("We now focus our attention on the
interrogatories from the Bank... which ultimately led to the trial court's granting
of summary judgment.").
259. 793 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1986).
260. Kegel, 793 F.2d at 927-28 (noting production burden).
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Inc.26 1 In that case, a distributor had filed suit, alleging that its relation-
ship with the defendant-manufacturer was a franchise and that its distribu-
torship agreement had been wrongfully terminated. 262 The defendant
moved for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff had of-
fered no affidavits in opposition to its motion for summary judgment. 263
Remarkably, the Eighth Circuit, citing Adickes, held:
This argument misapprehends the burdens of proof the parties
to a summary judgment proceeding must meet. The burden of
establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of material
fact is on the moving party. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 . . . (1970) . . . . Nothing in the
affidavits submitted by [defendant] purports to negate the exis-
tence of [the material] facts .... Therefore defendant did not
meet its initial burden . . . and summary judgment must be de-
nied notwithstanding the absence of opposing affidavits or other
evidence. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 159-60.264
Eventually, Celotex was adopted, as the Eight Circuit acknowledged in 1988
that it was becoming "more hospitable to summary judgments than in the
past."265 The Celotex standard has since prevailed in the Nebraska federal
courts.
2 6 6
The state courts of Nebraska have likewise resisted incorporating a
Celotex-like standard into their jurisprudence. Since 1982, Nebraska state
courts have cited Hanzlik v. Paustian,26 7 which is an Adickes-like standard,
as the governing standard for application of the state summary judgment
261. 825 F.2d 167, 174 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing and applying Adickes) (citation
omitted).
262. See Cambee's Furniture, 825 F.2d at 168-69 (noting facts and procedural
history).
263. See id. (examining defendant's arguments for summary judgment).
264. Id. at 174 (citations omitted). For another application by the Eighth Cir-
cuit of the prior (Adickes) standard, see Anderson v. Roberts, 823 F.2d 235, 238 (8th
Cir. 1987), which was decided one month after Celotex.
265. City of Mount Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273
(8th Cir. 1988); see also Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods,
Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1987) ("While we generally use summary judg-
ment 'sparingly' in anti-trust litigation, summary procedures are appropriate
where the issues for resolution are primarily legal rather than factual."); Hegg v.
United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no genuine issue of
whether defendant acted willfully or maliciously); Famous Brands, Inc. v. David
Sherman Corp., 814 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding informal agreement
followed by conduct pursuant to that agreement raised genuine issue of material
fact).
266. See, e.g., Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing and
applying Celotex); McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir.
1995) (same); Thelma D. ex rel. Delores A. v. Board of Educ. of St. Louis, 934 F.2d
929, 932 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Mitchell v. Mills County, 847 F.2d 486, 489 (8th
Cir. 1988) (same); LeNeave v. N. Am. Life Assurance Co., 854 F.2d 317, 318 (8th
Cir. 1988) (same).
267. 318 N.W.2d 712 (Neb. 1982).
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rule. To this end, in 1995, many years after Celotex and City of Mount Pleas-
ant, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated:
[The defendant] again failed to meet the burden of a movant for
summary judgment of proving that no genuine issues of material
fact exist . . . . That [plaintiff] has not yet adduced evidence
supporting her allegations is of no consequence. In the absence
of a primafacie showing by the movant that she is entitled to sum-
mary judgment, the opposing party is not required to reveal evi-
dence which [sic] she expects to produce at trial to prove the
allegations contained in her petition.2 68
Thus, for more than a decade, Nebraska federal and state courts have em-
ployed different summary judgment standards, notwithstanding uniform
textual rules.
269
III. THE CAUSE OF INTRA-STATE UNIFORMITY
Based upon the survey data examined here, the most likely explana-
tion for the evolution of uniform pleading standards for civil rights plain-
tiffs in the federal and state courts of the three subject states is the
influence of a local legal culture on indeterminate pleading rules. This
conclusion rests primarily on the fact that, while substantial intra-state uni-
formity was observed in all three states, it manifested itself differently in
each. Local variations in outcome can be caused by an embedded legal
culture in which judges, lawyers, and other repeat actors influence the
application of the law within each state. In the circumstances surveyed
here, the practice of a local legal culture appears to have assimilated the
standards for pleading under code pleading and notice pleading, respec-
tively. While the two regimes are fundamentally antithetical, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the procedural codes of the three subject
states are not drafted with an exactitude that strictly constrains their appli-
cation-and thus their interaction and integration-in practice.
The data from the survey demonstrates not only that a uniform plead-
ing standard evolved within each state, notwithstanding the fundamentally
different regimes of notice and code pleading, but also that the uniform
standard within each state was distinguishable from the others. These uni-
fying forces that are unique, localized within each state, and not the result
of formal legal standards, are likely the product of a "local legal cul-
268. Roubideaux v. Davenport, 530 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Neb. 1995) (citing
Hanzlik).
269. See Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Neb. 1999) (citing Han-
zlik); Boyle v. Welsh, 589 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Neb. 1999) (same); Wagner v. Pope,
531 N.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Neb. 1995) (applying Hanzlik standard). But see Gillespie
v. Smith, No. A-98-181, 1999 WL 502140, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. July 6, 1999) (apply-
ing standard that resembles Celotex).
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ture."270 A "legal culture" refers to the composite of shared norms, exper-
iences, expectations and values of lawyers, judges and other institutional
forces (whether legal or non-legal) that, while not necessarily reflected in
the textual rules, nonetheless inhere in the standards that are applied. 27'
The pertinent "locality" here is everything within the boundary of each of
the subject states.27 2
In Illinois, for example, the uniqueness of that state's uniformity was
demonstrated by the dynamic conformity of the pleading standards. The
pleading standards applied in practice by the federal and state courts
evolved similarly and simultaneously, notwithstanding the fundamental
differences between the regimes of notice and code pleading in the Illi-
nois federal and state courts, respectively. 273 This dynamic uniformity was
illustrated in Figure 1, which was discussed earlier in this article and is
reprinted here:
FicuRE 1
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270. SeeJean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cul-
tures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 518 (1993) (acknowledging normative influence of
legal cultures); Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and
the Control of Litigation, 27 LAw & Soc'y REv. 535, 537-38 (1993) (same); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1498, 1502 (1996) (same); Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs,
Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 127, 136 (1999)
(same); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 4, at 2046 (same); Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Courts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994) (same).
271. See EDWARD BURNETr TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE 1 (1871) (defining legal
culture). The term "culture" has myriad anthropologic meanings and connota-
tions. The author uses the term most generically in this context. One classic defi-
nition of culture, provided by the nineteenth century English anthropologist
Edward Burnett Tylor in the first paragraph of his book Primitive Culture will suf-
fice: "Culture . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a
member of society." See id.
272. Of course, the locality could be either broader or more localized. To be
sure, the locality is not national. However, the locality could be broader than a
single state and might extend, for example, to some or all of the states within the
same federal circuit. Alternatively, the locality could be even more localized if the
data collected from each state were parsed. Indeed, the methodology of the in-
stant survey assumed that the state was the appropriate locality; however, the sub-
stantial periods of time when the pleading standard was "mixed" could indicate
that a narrower locality may have been appropriate. Expanding or shrinking the
locality does not, however, alter the thesis or the conclusions of this essay.
273. For further discussion, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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The dynamic quality of this uniformity is even more impressive upon con-
sideration of the control data. There was a lag of approximately three
years before the Illinois state court adopted the federal court's interpreta-
tion of a nearly identical summary judgment rule. 274 Thus, the Illinois
state courts conformed even more quickly to the interpretation of the fun-
damentally different pleading rule than to the nearly identical summary
judgment rule. In any event, Shelton's "all for one and one for all" vision
of intra-state procedural uniformity has been obtained in practice in Illi-
nois, even if not in form.
The uniqueness of Pennsylvania's uniformity was demonstrated by a
staggered uniformity, as state adoption of the federal standards lagged sev-
eral years behind. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 2, the lag between fed-
eral and state court adoption was such that the pleading standards were
identical at almost no point in time. Importantly, however, these lags do
not preclude a finding of intra-state uniformity. In fact, if the time-lines
from Figure 2 are adjusted to account for a lag of approximately six years,
as done below in Figure 4, the evidence suggests virtually identical patterns,
and hence, intra-state uniformity.
FicuRE 4
PA -
Notice 1 Mixed N Fact
Moreover, a staggered pattern of uniformity was also observed in the con-
trol data. It took approximately two years for Pennsylvania state courts to
conform interpretations of their identical state summaryjudgment rule to
the new interpretation of Federal Rule 56.275 Although the lengthier de-
lay prior to state adoption of the federal pleading standard may well be
attributable to the textual dissimilarity between the rules, the significant
finding is that, in any event, the patterns establish that substantial intra-
state uniformity is ultimately obtained.
Moreover, the fact that the Pennsylvania federal and state courts were
the forerunners, both to and from a standard of heightened pleading, is
even more compelling evidence of the effect of a local legal culture in
Pennsylvania. Indeed, fact pleading was introduced in the federal and
state courts of Pennsylvania before either of their respective federal or
274. For further discussion, see supra notes 229-42 and accompanying text.
275. For further discussion, see supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
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state counterparts. 276 Additionally, Pennsylvania federal and state courts
began the retreat from fact pleading back to notice before any of their
respective counterparts; in fact, the federal and state courts of Penn-
sylvania relaxed their pleading standards even before the Supreme Court
decided Leatherman.277 Hence, even with the staggered uniformity, the
Pennsylvania federal and state courts have unique and substantially uni-
form pleading standards vis-A-vis the other survey states.
Another unique type of intra-state uniformity was observed in the fed-
eral and state courts of Nebraska. As in Pennsylvania, the data from Ne-
braska state courts suggest that a lag of approximately six years preceded
state adoption of the federal heightened pleading standard. Figure 3 is
reprinted here:
FIGuR 3
CTA8 0 I1
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H Notice 3 Mixed N Fact
The graph may, however, exaggerate the duration of the lag; there were
only two topical and relevant state court opinions reported between the
years 1986 and 1992, and both were published in 1987. On the other
hand, the control data suggests that an even lengthier lag may be typical:
for well over a decade, the Nebraska federal and state courts have applied
different summary judgment standards to virtually identical rules. 278
In any event, the most compelling evidence of a local legal culture in
the federal and state courts of Nebraska is the unique reluctance of the
courts to adopt new standards. For example, while the federal and state
courts of Pennsylvania were trailblazers in adopting standards of fact
pleading and, thereafter, notice pleading, the federal and state courts of
Nebraska were the last to adopt a standard of fact pleading and were the
last to commence a retreat to notice pleading.279 In fact, opinions of the
federal courts still routinely exhibit the badges of fact pleading, notwith-
standing the mandate of Leatherman; nor has the state court retreated to a
standard of notice pleading.280 Similarly, the Nebraska federal courts
276. For further discussion, see supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
277. For further discussion, see supra note 251 and accompanying text.
278. For further discussion, see supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
279. For further discussion, see supra notes 267-69 and 257-68 and accompa-
nying text.
280. For further discussion, see supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
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were reluctant to follow the mandate of Celotex, and, as stated above, the
state courts have yet to acquiesce. 281
The composition of the local legal cultures at work in each of the
survey states is likely an amalgamation of innumerable forces and pres-
sures. For example, lawyers could be very influential in shaping a local
legal culture and, more particularly, a standard of pleading. Federal and
state bar associations within a locality are-if not the same attorneys-
members of the same law firms, committees and organizations; they are
graduates of the same law schools; they attend the same continuing legal
education classes; and they navigate through the same social circles. The
norms of such a culture could affect a pleading standard because the law-
yers determine, in the first instance, whether even to challenge the factual
sufficiency of a complaint. Absent such a challenge, the courts are un-
likely ever to address the issue. When a challenge is brought before a
court, the local culture of the bar may already have established a certain
standard that the judge essentially adopts as practical.2 8 2 After all, federal
and state judges were likely drawn from the local bar and thus, may share
those similarities of culture already discussed. Moreover, federal and state
court judges may themselves share (and thus impose) certain norms and
expectations that are a product of their common experiences and institu-
tional pressures. 283
This Article does not undertake the exercise of parsing the compo-
nents of the unique local legal cultures in each of the three survey states.
Instead, it relies more broadly on the empirical data, which demonstrates
conclusively that the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs within fed-
eral and state courts of each of the three states is substantially uniform,
and also that that uniform standard is unique in each locality. The term
"local legal culture," then, is a descriptive label for those unique and unify-
ing forces within that locality.
One cannot, however, expect the unifying influence of a local legal
culture to enable assimilation of textually dissimilar rules in every instance.
For example, if federal and state courts within a particular state had funda-
mentally different rules for assigning newly filed cases to courts and
281. For further discussion, see supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
282. Though uttered in a slightly different context, Charles Clark quipped in
1938, "[H]abit has a tendency to become our master." Clark, Handmaid, supra
note 40, at 300 (discussing substance-procedure dichotomy).
283. There is evidence in the survey, for example, that federal and state
courts shared a fear that society was becoming too litigious and that civil rights
actions, in particular, were particularly onerous, given their potential to embarrass
public officials and to inordinately consume public funds in defense litigation.
Naturally, federal and state court judges may also be subject to very different
pressures. For example, state judges may be elected rather than appointed posi-
tions; caseloads may'also be shrinking in one jurisdiction while growing in an-
other. The argument is not that the federal and state courts are always subject to
identical pressures, but rather that there appears to be a set of common pressures
that results in a uniform standard of pleading in civil rights cases.
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judges, surely a standard common to both jurisdictions would not evolve
in practice. Nor would, say, different federal and state limits on the num-
ber of depositions a party may take in discovery evolve into a single stan-
dard in practice within a particular locality. Indeed, some other factor(s)
must be present in order for the local legal culture to unify rules in prac-
tice. In the circumstances surveyed here, that factor seems to be a certain
threshold level of indeterminacy in the pertinent formal rules. Because
the language of neither the procedural codes nor the Federal Rules im-
poses an absolute mandate, the indeterminate language is trumped-or at
least significantly influenced by-the assimilative effect of the local legal
culture.
The indeterminacy of federal and state pleading standards is demon-
strated, first, by the fact that the applied standards have experienced dra-
matic historical shifts between standards of fact and notice pleading. This
survey tracks patterns of evolution in all six jurisdictions between fact and
notice pleading standards. Neither the mandate of notice pleading under
the Federal Rules, nor the mandate of fact pleading under the respective
state pleading codes was substantively amended at any point in the past
sixty years. 284 The indeterminacy of the rules is indicated by the fact that
neither the federal nor state pleading rules historically have been applied
consistently and uniformly even within those jurisdictions.
Next, the indeterminacy of the two standards is apparent from the
language of the pertinent rules. Under code pleading, a plaintiff must
allege "[a] plain and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause
of action [including defense or counterclaim] without unnecessary repeti-
tion."2 85 A fundamental achievement of code pleading was to shift the
purpose of pleading from the development of issues to the development
of facts, 286 but this system led to hopelessly formalistic disputes over what
constituted "facts" and whether there was a meaningful distinction be-
284. The last serious proposal to amend Federal Rule 8(a) was in the early
1950s, when a group of reformers sought to revive code pleading by requiring the
plaintiff to allege "the facts constituting the cause of action." Claim or Cause of
Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952). The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
rejected the proposed change, and Conley v. Gibson put the reform movement to
rest. See Marcus, supra note 62, at 445-46 (discussing rejection of code pleading
reform). More recently, some advocates of non-trans-substantive procedure have
advocated different pleading requirements for different substantive categories of
cases. See Robins, supra note 63, at 638 (noting that position of those who argue
procedural rules should vary with cause of action).
285. CLARK, HANDBOOK 2, supra note 42, at 210 (discussing requirements of
code pleading); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Re-
form: Drafting Procedural Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 520-21 (1957) (same).
286. See FREDERIC MATILAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 15
(1909) (contrasting modem emphasis on facts with older procedures); THEODORE
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 410 (5th ed. 1956) (describ-
ing system as driving plaintiffs to plead fact itself); RoscoE POUND & THEODORE F.
T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAw 421-22
(3d ed. 1927) (explaining requirements for plaintiff's declaration).
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tween conclusions (of law) and facts. 28 7 The codes did not specifically
outline the factual predicate minimally necessary to maintain a claim, and,
as a result, a greater level of specificity was required for certain disfavored
actions, while more commonly accepted actions could be pled gener-
ally.288 The language of the codes neither prescribed nor proscribed in-
terpretations at either extreme.
The drafters of the Federal Rules expressed their general antipathy
toward the pleading of "facts," but the simpler alternative of notice plead-
ing similarly lacks interpretative guidance. 289 All that is required of a
plaintiff is "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."290 The inherent ambiguity is that while "[a]
'short and plain statement of the claim' implies mere notice[,] ... a 'show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief' implies a threshold showing as to
all essential elements of the claim." 29 1 Such language exemplifies the
drafters' vision "to effectively contain and direct judicial discretion by
287. Plaintiffs were required to plead "ultimate" rather than "evidentiary"
facts or conclusions of law. SeeJOHN N. POMEROY, THE EQurrY SYSTEM OF PLEADING
640 (5th ed. 1929) (discussing pleading requirements); see also CLARK, HANDBOOK
2, supra note 42, at 231-47 (noting dispute as to what constituted facts); Cook,
Facts, supra note 91, at 244-46 (same); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 416, 419-21 (1921) [hereinafter Cook,
Statements] (same); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HRv. L. REv. 1303, 1336-38
(1942) (same); Robins, supra note 63, at 642 (discussing historical backdrop to
pleading under federal rules); Carl C. Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action,
20 CORNELL L.Q. 185, 187 (1935) (noting dispute as to what constituted facts).
288. See CLARK, HANDBOOK 2, supra note 42, at 231 ("Our real problems is,
How specific must the pleader be?"); Cook, Facts, supra note 91, at 243 (question-
ing whether allegations provide sufficient detail to be proper statements of fact);
Cook, Statements, supra note 287, at 420-23 (stating that primary question in apply-
ing code distinctions is desirability of more specificity); James Alger Fee, The Lost
Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 COLUM. L. RE.v. 491,
492-93 (1948) (discussing conflicting interpretations of pleading requirements);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 628, 629 (1988) (discussing joinder of claims and parties);
Marcus, supra note 62, at 438 (noting evolution and corruption of simplified plead-
ing); Robins, supra note 63, at 642 (discussing historical backdrop to pleading
under federal rules); Subrin, Equity, supra note 8, 933 (discussing common law
mentality in pre-twentieth-century America).
289. In the notice pleading regime, plaintiffs were intended only to give the
other party notice of the claim, not to refine any issues nor to discover facts. In-
deed, the drafters took great pains to avoid even using the word "fact" in the con-
text of pleading.
Reformers urged that procedure should be merely "the handmaid ofjus-
tice," and that a system of procedural rules should deliver, rather than
hinder, substance. Subsidiary to this conception, critics argued that
pleading should merely give general notice of the nature of a claim,
rather than refine issues for interception.
Robins, supra note 63, at 643 (citations omitted).
290. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2). For further discussion, see supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text.
291. Robins, supra note 63, at 645 (citations omitted) (citing ROBERT W. MIL-
LAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 192
(1952)); see also Baumann et al., supra note 30, at 214 n.11 (tracing confusion over
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broadening the channel in which it runs."2 92 The net result, however, is a
pleading standard that suffers from some of the same infirmities of code
pleading: the text of the rule is colorable and, therefore, subject to proce-
dural manipulation in practice. 29 3 The Supreme Court endorsed a very
liberal vision of notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson,294 holding that a "com-
plaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."295 But this interpretation was
vulnerable from its outset: "taken literally, it might have precluded dismis-
sal in any cases where the plaintiff invoked a valid legal theory. How can a
court ever be certain that a plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him
to relief?" 29 6
Finally, the indeterminacy of the pleading standards is demonstrated
by the standards articulated in various opinions of federal and state courts
of the three subject states. As demonstrated throughout Part II of this
Article, federal and state courts use rhetoric borrowed (whether credited
or not) 29 7 from the jurisprudence of the other in applications of their
respective standards. For example, when Illinois state courts applied the
badges of notice pleading, the language used by the state courts could
easily be mistaken as an application of notice pleading under the Federal
Rules: "The Petition ... need only raise a fair question as to the existence
of the claimed right .... This petition contains sufficient allegations and
gave enough information to indicate a possible violation of the Civil Rights
Statute."298 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit's applications of standards of
fact pleading could be mistaken as an application of the state's procedural
code: "[A] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to outline the cause of action,
proof of which is essential to recovery."299 Because the text of neither the
federal nor the state rules proscribed such interpretations, federal and
term "notice pleading" to Charles E. Clark, who recognized these two types of no-
tice functions).
292. Carrington, supra note 26, at 949 (stating that "'Tight will tear; wide will
wear' was the sartorial wisdom" of drafters).
293. See Subrin, Field Code, supra note 8, at 311-13 (describing rules as "in de-
cline, if not in [their] death throes").
294. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
295. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
296. Marcus, supra note 62, at 434.
297. State courts would occasionally and sporadically cite to federal court
opinions as persuasive, although obviously not dispositive, when articulating the
state pleading standard. Ironically, this tended to occur more frequently when
state courts were requiring plaintiffs to plead with greater specificity; instead of
relying on their own strict pleading codes, the courts took comfort in federal cases
deviating from the federal standard.
298. People ex rel. Clark v. McCurdie, 220 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Ill. App. Ct.
1966).
299. Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
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state courts appear to use a combined reservoir of rhetoric to pen their
respective opinions.
Moreover, on occasion, courts have attempted to reconcile the stan-
dards of code and notice pleading. Consider, for example, this excerpt
from Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Judge Pellegrini:
Even though the federal courts have a notice system of pleading
in civil rights cases, federal courts have required a plaintiff to
plead the underlying facts with a specificity akin to the fact plead-
ing required by [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] 1019(a).
Under fact pleading, "the complaint must apprise the defendant
of the nature and extent of the plaintiffs claim so that the defen-
dant has notice of what the plaintiff intends to prove at trial and
may prepare to meet such proof with his own evidence."
300
Judge Higginbotham of the Third Circuit used similar reasoning in Holder
v. City of Allentown,30 1 when stating:
The test in reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings,
plaintiff may be entitled to relief. . . . The complaint will be
deemed to allege sufficient facts if it is adequate to "put the
proper defendants on notice of the essential elements of plain-
tiffs' cause of action."30 2
These excerpts demonstrate the indeterminacy of both federal and state
pleading standards because they suggest that the standards can be recon-
ciled. In both instances, the judges conclude that a certain quantum of
"facts" are required, but the threshold is only those facts necessary to give
the defendant "notice" of the claim. Harmonization of the standards
under the regimes of notice pleading and code pleading was not the "sig-
nificant reform" that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
envisioned.30 3
300. Heinly v. Commonwealth, 621 A.2d 1212, 1216-17 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
301. 987 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1993).
302. Holder, 987 F.2d at 194 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see
also Carter v. City of Phila., 989 F.2d 117, 118 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Particularly when a
civil rights violation is alleged, we should not affirm a dismissal at the pleading
stage, unless it is readily discerned that the facts cannot support entitlement to
relief.").
303. The following anecdote illustrates the significance of the reform:
At a meeting in Cleveland .... Mr. Clark stated that he heard from a
lawyer who criticized [the new pleading] Rules. The lawyer said .... [A]
sixteen-year old boy could plead under these rule!" "Well, I would say, in
answer," observed Mr. Clark, "Why not, if he tells the court what his case
is about? And that is what we are trying to ask the lawyers to do, and to
do quite simply."
CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING 26 n.18 (1952) (quoting SEC v.
Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1939)).
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The most likely cause of uniform pleading standards for civil rights
plaintiffs in the federal and state courts of the three subject states appears
to be the influence of a local legal culture on indeterminate pleading
rules. The influence of a local legal culture is evinced by unique and uni-
form standards within each of the subject states. The indeterminacy of the
pleading rules is demonstrated by: (i) the evidence of deviation within
each jurisdiction; (ii) the text of the rules; and (iii) the efforts by judges to
reconcile and blend the applicable standards. Although the regimes of
notice pleading and code pleading are fundamentally antithetical, the uni-
fying influence of a local legal culture assimilates the standards applied in
practice.
IV. CONCLUSION: LOCATING ROLES FOR THE RHETORIC AND
FOR THE RULES
This survey of pleading standards applied by the federal and state
courts of the three subject states to civil rights plaintiffs presents compel-
ling evidence of intra-state uniformity in fact, notwithstanding the funda-
mentally different regimes of notice and code pleading. The survey's
conclusion of substantial intra-state uniformity initially may seem reassur-
ing. As participants in contemporary reform discourse, we are familiar
with the rhetoric, if not hyperbole, of disuniformity, chaos and complexity
in contemporary procedure.30 4 And, one might find some solace in a sur-
vey that concludes procedure may not be as disuniform, chaotic or com-
plex as we thought. At a more abstract level, however, the survey reveals a
troubling fissure between form and practice that both tarnishes the ubiq-
uitous rhetoric of uniformity and challenges the effectiveness of procedu-
ral rules as a mechanism for legal reform.
First, the survey's conclusion of uniformity in practice casts a shadow
of empirical doubt on essentially all reform discourse that implicates the
norm of uniformity. Most proposals for legal reform rest on an untested
(even unstated) assumption that a change in form (e.g., the rules) will
effect the desired change. One salient finding of this survey is that a for-
mal change may not effect the desired change because the change may
already have occurred. Under such circumstances, the rhetoric of uni-
formity would be misplaced or even misleading. Although a reform to
codify an existing uniform standard of application may be worthwhile, the
rhetoric of uniformity presumably would be far less compelling.
The list of current reform efforts that might be vulnerable to empiri-
cal study is, of course, as long as the list of reform efforts that implicate the
rhetoric of uniformity.30 5 To be sure, not every formal dissimilarity is or
304. For further discussion, see supra notes 283-302 and accompanying text.
See generally Subrin, TEACHING, supra note 52 (discussing disuniformity and com-
plexity in contemporary civil procedure).
305. For further discussion, see supra note 14-26, 29-30 and accompanying
text.
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will be applied uniformly in practice. 30 6 The intent of this Article is not to
suggest that they are, but rather to ensure that the question of whether they
are is raised if and when some well-intentioned reform draws on the power-
ful rhetoric of uniformity in support of (or in opposition to) some legal
reform. 30 7 Many scholars have lamented that procedural reforms are
wont to bypass serious empirical research; 30 8 at a minimum, the variance
between form and practice demonstrated here highlights one reason that
empirical study is a necessary prerequisite to principled reform discourse.
Further, the survey's conclusion of uniformity in practice emasculates
the role of rules as the progenitor of procedural reform. A uniform plead-
ing standard evolved in each of the subject states without the benefit of,
indeed in spite of, formal rules. This concern is especially poignant be-
cause the control data from Nebraska suggest that even a rule that is iden-
tical in form may nevertheless be applied differently by courts in practice.
Hence, although even identical texts do not ensure uniform applications,
some other (unifying) force can, under certain circumstances, trump even
significant formal differences.
Ambivalence about the significance of formal rules is not particularly
novel. Professor David Shapiro, for example, has argued that behavior
often precedes formal legal reform. 30 9 In Shapiro's model, rules can be
reflective, as opposed to prescriptive, and the significance of formal rules
is thereby diminished. The legal realist movement and its progeny long
306. And, of course, not all of the rhetoric of uniformity concerns textual
dissimilarities.
307. This survey examined the federal and state courts in only three states;
and, in those few states, the survey focused only on narrow slices of the jurispru-
dence of pleading and summary judgment. With regard to the former, the survey
focused on only one substantive category of cases. Although the survey was com-
prehensive with respect to those particular states and rules (because it captured
the data for every case within this scope), this population does not purport to be a
representative sample of all other applications of pleading and summaryjudgment
rules. Nor is it necessarily typical or representative of the uniformity experienced
under all other rules-procedural or otherwise. Because the findings of the survey
are exemplary of phenomena that could be present outside this narrow context,
this possibility gives rise to the broader questions raised in this essay.
308. See Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure,
22 TEx. TECH L. REV. 323, 334 (1991) ("[W]ith rare exceptions, rule changes sel-
dom have been based on empirical research."); Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn
in Procedural Rule Making: Comment on Walker, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 595, 597 (1994)
(opposing certain procedural reforms); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 464-69 (1993) (discussing re-
form and its obstacles). See generally Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and the Profession, 30 WAKE FoREST L.
REv. 347 (1995) (proposing empirical scholarship reform).
309. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1991-98 (1989) (commenting on underlying
assumptions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see alsoJudith Resnik, Changing
Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil
Justice, and CivilJudging, 49 At-A. L. REV. 133, 157 (1997) ("National rulemaking...
frequently represents codification of practice and reflection of change rather than
commencement of newly-minted regimes.").
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have emphasized this variance between form and practice. 3 10 In the real-
ists' model, rules are relevant but are not dispositive of results; individual
actors (namelyjudges) interject variation into otherwise predictable appli-
cations of rules.3 11 The evidence of intra-state uniformity presented here
lends some empirical support to both of these theories. But, I do not en-
deavor to tackle either of these theories here; instead, I shine the light on
but one corner of this oversized room. 312
The survey suggests the cause of this particular instance of intra-state
uniformity was the effect of a local legal culture on indeterminate plead-
ing rules. The evidence of a local legal culture suggests that formal rules
targeted (or expected) to yield certain consequences can be subverted by
localized influences and pressures. To be sure, the local legal culture that
is credited here with assimilating fundamentally different pleading stan-
dards may be largely influenced by factors that are unique to the circum-
stances surveyed here. For example, a local legal culture may not unify
disparate standards absent the influence of a dominant regime.3 13
If not hegemonic, the influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is certainly pervasive. 314 In each of the survey states, none of the
state courts introduced the badges of fact or notice pleading until the cor-
responding federal court had already done so. 3 15 In addition, to the ex-
tent that there was any cross-citation between the federal and state courts,
310. See generally Sullivan et al., supra note 270, at 803-04 (analyzing local legal
culture's anthropological use).
311. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICANtJUMSPRUDENCE 65-159
(1995) (providing history of legal realism); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal
Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 498-99 (1996) (same).
312. Professor Shapiro created this wonderful metaphor. See Shapiro, supra
note 309, at 1969 ("My own inclination, when confronted with .. .a cosmic ques-
tion, is to try to particularize it by looking at an important instance of the prob-
lem-to see whether light from one corner can help to illuminate the whole
room.").
313. See Sullivan et al., supra note 270, at 803-05 (discussing local legal
culture).
314. For further discussion, see supra note 47 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing textual adoption generally). In addition, see supra notes 204-06 and accompa-
nying text (discussing summary judgment rules).
315. For examples, see supra notes 124 & 131 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Illinois state court adoption of fact pleading and notice pleading standards,
respectively); see supra notes 171 & 175 and accompanying text (discussing Penn-
sylvania state court adoption of fact pleading and notice pleading standards, re-
spectively); see supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing Nebraska state
court adoption of fact pleading standard).
Importantly, however, the lags between federal and state court adoption of
the pleading standards (in Pennsylvania and Nebraska) could also evince indepen-
dence or coincidence. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text (discussing
lag times in adoption of pleading standards by Pennsylvania and Nebraska state
courts). For contrast, however, see supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Illinois state court adoption of federal court pleading standard). The
Pennsylvania state court's failure to mention Celotex when introducing and apply-
ing that (Celotex) standard to the identical state court summary judgment rule. may
also be significant. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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this was strictly a one-way phenomenon, with state courts citing federal
precedent.3 16 Whether a dominant regime, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, is a prerequisite to assimilation by a local legal culture
would be an interesting subject of further study.
The local legal culture may also have been especially influential
under the circumstances surveyed here because civil rights cases are espe-
cially likely to be "political" and, thus, subject to a unique set of institu-
tional forces and pressures.3 17 Regardless, a local legal culture can
facilitate, if not introduce systemic variation and we should be aware of the
subtle contours of that influence.3 18 If the potential influence of a local
legal culture is overlooked, reformers could overstate the anticipated im-
pact of the reform, either because the culture may already have affected
the reform in fact, even if not in form, or because the culture may
trump-or at least significantly influence-the application of the reform
(i.e., a formal rule) in practice.
This survey further suggests that the indeterminacy of the mandates
under code and notice pleading, respectively, enabled-or perhaps even
invited 319 -the local legal culture to assimilate them. Although notice
and code pleading are fundamentally antithetical in tradition, scope and
even text, the language of neither proffers a rigid standard for application
in practice.3 20 As a result, the pleading standard within all six of the fed-
eral and state jurisdictions examined here has been variously applied in
manners consistent and inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the
governing rules. The sensitivity of indeterminate rules to institutional
forces and pressures is particularly significant because such indeterminacy
inheres in procedure generally, and in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in particular. 321
This survey reveals a dissonance between form and practice that is
unsettling. As participants in the discourse of reform, our rhetoric and
our proposals emphasize formal uniformity. Yet, despite our rhetoric and
our proposals, we may already have (or, alternatively, may never have)
316. Citations by state courts to federal court precedent occurred infre-
quently and almost exclusively in Section 1983 cases, where state courts were en-
tangled in the requirements of pleading these claims that can blend substance and
procedure. For further discussion, see supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text
(discussing Illinois state court adoption of federal pleading standard). For a con-
trast, see supra note 254 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania court's
adoption of new summary judgment standard without mention of Celotex).
317. See generally Baumann et al., supra note 30 (discussing local legal culture).
318. See Sullivan et al., supra note 270 at 803-04 (discussing local legal
culture).
319. The survey data suggest either that local legal cultures may assimilate
rules, unless the rules are drafted to proscribe such applications in practice, or,
conversely, that indeterminate rules may invite assimilation by local legal cultures.
320. For further discussion, see supra notes 285-303 and accompanying text.
321. For further discussion, see supra notes 285-303 and accompanying text.
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what must be the purest form of uniformity-uniformity of result.3 22 We
must be mindful of unstated and untested assumptions lurking behind the
powerful rhetoric of uniformity. We must appreciate the role that a local
legal culture and other influences that are difficult to quantify might have
played (or will play), formal rules notwithstanding.
322. Uniformity of result perhaps is the only true virtue of uniformity. This
theme has been invoked for centuries. Commenting upon Lord Mansfield's state-
ment that, "we must act alike in all cases of like nature," Judge Henry J. Friendly
termed this "the most basic principle of jurisprudence." Henry Friendly, Indiscre-
tion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982); see also Subrin, Federal Rules,
supra note 4, at 2002-06 (elaborating on pro-uniformity movement); Yamamoto,
supra note 2, at 387 (discussing that ironic result of uniform procedure is dis-
uniform results).
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